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‘Resilience’ occupies a prominent place in contemporary discussions around the 
governance of humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises and insecurity more broadly. 
The aim of this study was to further our understanding of resilience as a governance 
rationality and a policy discourse, in particular with regards to the gap between 
scholars’ critique and resilience’s rapid uptake in practitioner circles. The academic 
debates on resilience within a variety of disciplines were reviewed, combined with 13 
key informant interviews with resilience experts from a range of international 
development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding organisations at the governmental, inter-
governmental, and non-governmental level. The results indicate that resilience is first 
and foremost a response to a radically different understanding of contemporary risks 
and crises as inevitable and complex. Practitioners add that resilience is also a response 
to the current structures of the international system that are ill-fitted to address the needs 
that arise out of contemporary protracted crises. While scholars point towards 
resilience’s dynamics of decentralization and responsibilisation that mirror neoliberal 
logics, practitioners point to the reverse: smarter programming that (problematically) 
necessitates joint-up efforts between humanitarian action and development assistance. 
There is nevertheless a common concern about resilience’s potential for depoliticisation, 
rendering invisible the structural factors that limit individuals’ agency and that (partly) 
define their vulnerabilities. In conclusion, resilience is an unfinished concept that refers 
to a certain interpretation of the world that designates a normative construction of how 
insecurity should be governed. Within a broader context of the ‘turn to complexity’, 
resilience ultimately seems to be about adaptation within the system, rather than system 
change. If resilience is to fulfil its potential to be a driver for effective, appropriate and 
acceptable programmes for peoples affected by violent insecurity, we should start by 











  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  The rise of resilience as a policy concept 
Since the turn of the decade, ‘resilience’ has been the governance rationality for 
international inter-, non-, and governmental organisations’ response to contemporary 
protracted crises – fragile contexts characterised by long-term political instability, 
(episodes of) violent conflict, and vulnerability of the lives and livelihoods of the 
population (Macrae & Harmer, 2004, p. 15).  
Some prominent examples of humanitarian policies in which the concept of resilience 
has been used extensively include the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection department (ECHO) Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone 
Countries 2013-2020, and consortium efforts like the Regional Refugee and Resilience 
Plan 2016-2017 (‘3RP’), which brings together no less than 200 partners including 
national governments, United Nations (UN) agencies, inter-governmental organizations 
(IGOs), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in an appeal of more than 5.7 
billion US dollars. Likewise, the first of its kind World Humanitarian Summit in 
Istanbul in May 2016 hosted resilience as a major theme, and resilience constitutes a 
leitmotif for the EU’s Global Strategy (Wagner & Anholt, 2016).  
As a working definition, resilience can be understood as a characteristic of systems, 
structures, organisations, communities, individuals, materials or biological organisms’ 
responses to crisis, characterised by the ability to absorb the shock, adapt to the new 
reality, and transform in order to function either as before the crisis, or in a superior 
manner (see for example Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013; Lorenz, 2013). It resonates with 
kindred terms such as adaptability, bouncing back, preparedness, self-protection, 
‘building back better’, participation, engagement, and (local) ownership.  
Despite its rapid and widespread uptake in (international) policies, ‘resilience’ is still a 
concept “in the making [emphasis in original]” (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013, p. 13), 
illustrated by the lack of agreed-upon definitions and approaches. This is demonstrated 
also in the European Commission’s report Resilience in Practice: Saving lives and 
improving livelihoods, which outlines various NGOs’ different understandings of what 
resilience is and what a resilience-based approach to protracted crises (should) entail(s). 
This however, is a technical discussion at the policy and implementation level, which 
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seems to neglect a critical exploration of whether and why resilience should be the 
governance rationality of choice for protracted crises response, and what the concept 
actually ‘does’ in practice. 
  
1.2  Academic engagement with resilience 
Unlike in the policy arena, resilience has interested scholars for almost half a century. 
The concept originally hails from the field of engineering, after which it was picked up 
in rapid fashion by other disciplines, including ecology and biology, psychology and 
psychiatry, as well as interdisciplinary fields, where it represents a successful outcome 
of the dynamic interplay between individuals and their environments – e.g., socio-
ecological adaptation, disaster preparedness (see for example Walker & Cooper, 2011).  
As a characteristic of systems however, the term ‘resilience’ is often attributed to 
Holling’s work on systems ecology in the 1970s, in which resilience is defined as “the 
ability of a system to maintain its structure and patterns of behaviour in the face of 
disturbance” (Holling, 1986, quoted in Frerks, Warner & Weijs, 2011). Similarly 
influential was the work of his contemporary, economist Friedrich Hayek, who worked 
on complex systems, in which resilience featured as a model for financial risk 
management (Walker & Cooper, 2011). Often neglected is the work of risk scholar 
Wildavsky, who argued for managing risk through trial and error rather than precaution: 
“Resilience is the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become 
manifest, learning to bounce back ... Are risks better managed, we may ask, by trying to 
anticipate and prevent bad outcomes before they occur, or by trying to mitigate such 
effects after they have shown up?” (Wildavsky, 1988, p. 77) 
Only recently, scholars from a variety of other academic disciplines – e.g., political 
science, international relations, security studies – have started to show interest in the 
concept of resilience as it relates to the multi-disciplinary issues of protracted 
humanitarian crises, and (in)security more broadly. The year 2012 for example, saw the 
launch of the peer-reviewed journal ‘Resilience: International Policies, Practices and 
Discourses’, which hosts a variety of articles that address how resilience operates.   
Despite the interests that emanates from academia, there is considerable unease with the 
widespread use of resilience in (international) policies. In fact, critical scholars have 
noted a “worrying consensus across government, business, and some quarters of 
academia that resilience is an unquestionably ‘good’ value to be striven for, invested in, 
and cultivated throughout society at whatever cost” (Brasset & Vaughan-Williams, 
2015, p.46). In contrast, critical accounts have expressed a wide variety of concerns, 
including for example over the neoliberal character of resilience (Brasset & Vaughan-
Williams, 2015; Chandler 2014), the redistribution of responsibility for security from 
governments to the affected peoples themselves (Howell, 2015a; Mohaupt, 2009), and 
the ‘inevitability’ which resilience lends to the character of contemporary crises (Evans 
& Reid, 2014).  
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1.3  Setting the objective: Linking theory to policy and practice 
At a glance, there seems to be a considerable gap between the extensive uptake of 
resilience in to (international) policies related to the governance of fragile contexts and 
protracted crises on the one hand, and critical scholarship that points to the (potential) 
impact of resilience on political life, on the other. These two debates converge around 
the fact that at present, resilience remains poorly understood.   
The aim of this exploratory study was twofold. The first aim was to further our 
understanding of resilience as both as a theoretical and policy concept, as it relates to 
the governance of protracted crises, humanitarian emergencies, and insecurity as a result 
of political violence and/or armed conflict. The second aim of this study was to further 
the understanding of resilience in particular with regards to the intersection between the 
theoretical and policy levels so as to shed some light on the apparent theory-policy gap. 
In order to do so, the current academic debates on resilience have been reviewed in 
order to provide an up-to-date narrative analysis of how resilience is understood. In 
addition, resilience experts from various international governmental, inter-
governmental, and non-governmental organisations have been interviewed in order to 
further the policy debate on resilience. These two sets of data will help to distil the 
similarities, differences and inconsistencies between the academic and policy debates.  
Whereas the end to widespread political violence and armed conflict is far from in sight, 
effective, appropriate and acceptable responses to the turmoil in the world’s fragile 
places are highly needed. This study analyses whether resilience is, or could be, one 






                THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
From the introduction it becomes clear that within the context of humanitarian 
emergencies, protracted crises and fragility due to political violence and armed conflict, 
resilience is a concept in the making. This chapter explicates this study’s theoretical 
framework, i.e. the way in which it has conceptualised ‘resilience’ as a basis for further 
understanding, and the factors deemed important for understanding why and how 
resilience became to be adopted within international policies. The following sections 
will therefore deal with resilience as a governance rationality and as policy discourse, 
and concludes with the study objective and research questions. 
 
2.1  Resilience as a governance rationality and policy discourse 
In the face of adversity, resilience may be understood as the ability to absorb the shock, 
adapt to the new reality, and transform in order to function similarly to, or better than, 
the situation before the crisis (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013; Lorenz, 2013). In the context 
of humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises and (in)security more broadly, the 
concept of resilience is a prominent rationality underlying contemporary (inter)national 
responses. The purpose of this study was to contribute to the understanding of resilience 
within this particular context. For this purpose, resilience is firstly understood as a 
rationality underlying security governance, and secondly, as a policy discourse.  
Governance, within this field, could be defined as the “increasingly organised and 
internationalised attempt to save the lives, enhance the welfare, and reduce the suffering 
of the world’s most vulnerable populations” (Barnett, 2013, abstract). Going one step 
further, using Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’, allows us to look more 
specifically at the why and how of governance. The term ‘governmentality’ links 
governance to thinking – mentalité in French, thereby illustrating that power and its 
underlying (political) rationality are indissoluble (Lemke, 2001). Governmentality 
indicates that ‘government’ (in the broadest sense of the word) defines not only the 
representation, but also structures the intervention (ibid). The term refers to a form of 
exercising power by way of an “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its 
11 
 
principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
apparatuses of security” (Foucault, 1991, p. 102 quoted in Larner & Walters, 2004). 
Resilience as governmentality thus refers to a specific way of exercising power by a 
mosaic of inter-, non-, and governmental organisations and institutions, guided by a way 
of thinking that determines the way in which a problem is framed (representation), as 
well as the way in which those problems should be tackled (action). This view of 
resilience as governmentality guides our review of the academic literature.  
Discourse, as the second concept through which this study approaches resilience, is 
about meaning and making meaning within the context of the complex relations that 
create social life (Fairclough, 2010). It “encompasses not only the substantive content of 
ideas but also the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed. Discourse is not 
just ideas or ‘text’ (what is said) but also context (where, when, how, and why it was 
said). The term refers not only to structure (what is said, or where and how) but also to 
agency (who said what to whom)” (Schmidt, 2008, p. 305). The French philosopher 
Foucault, most often associated with the concept of ‘discourse’, theorised it as the 
convergence of knowledge and power. In other words, the practices of power through 
which certain knowledges become dominant, or come to be considered ‘truth’.   
Knowledge, according to Foucault, “involves statements uttered in institutional sites in 
which [knowledge] is gained according to certain rules and procedures, by speakers 
who are authorised to say what counts as ‘truth’ in that particular context” (Nash, 2010, 
p. 22). It therefore relates to the idea of dominant frames, or even the concept of 
‘paradigm’. Knowledge necessitates power in order to become a ‘truth’: fluid and 
relational, power can therefore only be identified in the “instances of its exercise” 
(Nash, 2010, p. 21).  
The other way around holds true as well: the “manifold relations of power which 
permeate, characterise and constitute the social body ... cannot themselves be 
established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, 
circulation and functioning of a discourse” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93). Discourses, then, 
“contribute to [the] exercise [of power] in the production of social relations of authority 
and conformity [emphasis in original]” (Nash, 2010, p. 22). Within this view, resilience 
is understood as a set of knowledges that has become dominant, and which 
subsequently reproduces these particular power relations – this guides our analysis of 
the policy discourse around resilience. A critical analysis requires determining “how 
new objects of knowledge emerge, under what discursive and non-discursive 
conditions, and especially, what effects of power they produce” (Nash, 2010, p. 22). 
Understanding resilience as a rationality underlying the performance of a particular 
order of power (governmentality) and understanding resilience as a set of ideas that 
become dominant through the exercise of power – and power that is exercised by the 
generation of knowledges (discourse) are two very similar processes. The difference is 
however, that the first view is concerned with resilience as a particular strategy for 
managing protracted crises, humanitarian emergencies, and (in)security that has 
political and social implications. The second view sees resilience more as a set of ideas 
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contained in talk uttered at meetings (i.e. conferences, summits, between colleagues, 
etc.), policy documents and such, which have become dominant because of its particular 
context, structure, and the actors involved.  
 
2.2  Study objective and research questions 
The objective of this study is to critically explore the concept of ‘resilience’ in the 
context of (international) responses to humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises and 
(in)security more broadly, by reviewing the contemporary academic debates on 
resilience from various disciplines (political science, international relations, security 
studies, development studies etc.), and exploring the opinions and perceptions of 
resilience experts in the field (e.g., policymakers), in order to advance current 
understandings of the concept of resilience as it relates to today’s fragile contexts due to 
political violence and armed conflict. 
In order to do so, this study aims to answer the following research question: What does 
‘resilience’ mean in the context of (international) responses to humanitarian 
emergencies, protracted crises and (in)security more broadly due to political violence 








  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The primary objective of this exploratory study is to critically explore the concept of 
resilience in relation to (international) responses to humanitarian emergencies, 
protracted crises and general (in)security due to political violence and armed conflict, 
by reviewing current academic debates on resilience as a governance rationality and 
exploring the perceptions of experts on resilience as a policy discourse, in order to 
advance the resilience discussion on both the theoretical and policy level and in 
particular, at the intersection of these two fields. In order to answer the main research 
question: ‘What does ‘resilience’ mean in the context of (international) responses to 
humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises and (in)security more broadly due to 
political violence and armed conflict?’, the study employed a narrative literature review 
supplemented with key informant interviews. These methods will now be discussed. 
 
3.1  Narrative literature review 
Recent work on resilience in the context of responding to humanitarian emergencies, 
protracted crises and (in)security has yielded diverse and interesting, and sometimes 
provocative, insights. Now there is a need for structuring these observations in order to 
make sense of where the current academic debate stands, and what the major themes are 
in academics’ explorations of resilience. In order to help answer the main research 
question: ‘What does ‘resilience’ mean in the context of (inter)national responses to 
humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises and (in)security more broadly due to 
political violence and armed conflict?’, a narrative literature review was conducted.   
For the review, articles in scientific journals were initially selected if they used the word 
‘resilience’ in the context of responses to humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises 
and (in)security connected to political violence and armed conflict (thus excluding 
natural disasters), and if they had been published between the years 2000 and 2016. 
Within this context, resilience had to refer to a governance rationality/policy concept, 
and the review thus excluded articles that measured for example the socio-psychological 
resilience of conflict-affected populations. All article types were included, except 
systematic literature reviews or meta-reviews. 
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146 Potentially relevant publications identified  
66 Publications excluded based on title/abstract 
 
 80 Full-text publications retrieved for detailed evaluation 
 
 
 10 Publications excluded based on detailed review 
 
70 Full-text publications included in the review 
Keywords that were used to search for relevant publications were “resilience” or 
“resilient” AND the industry: “aid industry”; “human security”; “humanitarian action”, 
“peacekeeping”, “protection of civilians”; “humanitarian governance”; “humanitarian 
response”; or the context: “armed conflict”; “post-conflict”; “civil war”; “humanitarian 
emergency”. 
The searches were conducted in two databases; Web of Science, where the ‘cited by’ 
sections of initially selected articles were also searched, and Google Scholar, where the 
search was limited to the first 10 pages (= first 100 results). Articles were initially 
selected on the basis of whether the title and or the abstract indicated relevance. Table 
3A below depicts an overview of the inclusion and exclusion criteria.  
 
Table 3A  
Inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
• Publication date between 2000-
2016 
• Addresses resilience as a policy 
response to (in)security, conflict or 
post-conflict settings 
• Theoretical and empirical studies, 
as well as reports (grey literature) 
and commentaries 
• Publication date before 2000 
• Addresses resilience as a policy 
response to natural disasters 
exclusively  
• (Meta-)Review articles 
• Does not use the word resilience, but 
‘preparedness/readiness’, ‘building 
back better’, etc. (unless linked 
specifically) 
 
Figure 3B  











Figure 3B pictured above presents a schematic representation of the search process. 
Initially, 146 potentially relevant articles were selected. During a second selection 
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process, these publications were more carefully evaluated on the basis of their title and 
abstract, closely monitoring relevance alongside the selection criteria. This resulted in 
the discarding of 66 articles which were deemed irrelevant. The 80 remaining articles 
were carefully read, after which a further ten articles were again discarded. The 
remaining 70 were included in the narrative literature review.  
The selection process was carried out in April 2016. Therefore, any relevant articles 
published after this date have not been systematically included in this review. However, 
small-scale unsystematic searches were done sporadically since April, and have resulted 
in the inclusion of a few newer articles. Moreover, non-scientific literature (‘grey 
literature’, e.g., policy papers) was added where these provided relevant examples. 
 
3.2  Key informant interviews 
In addition to a narrative literature review, this study employed key informant 
interviews in order to help answer the main research question: ‘What does ‘resilience’ 
mean in the context of (international )responses to humanitarian emergencies, protracted 
crises and (in)security more broadly due to political violence and armed conflict?’. This 
additional method was used to supplement and compare findings from the literature 
with perspectives from experts, i.e., people who work directly with the concept of 
resilience.  Semi-structured interviews were chosen because of the exploratory nature of 
this study as well as the relative freedom that this structure provides.   
The interview questions were loosely based on the Political Power Framework (PPF), 
better known as the Shiffman and Smith framework, which was designed to explore 
why some issues or initiatives become political priorities, and others do not (Shiffman 
& Smith, 2007).  In essence, the PPF is a model for policy analysis, but one that 
emphasises the role of power – not just as it relates to the various types of actors 
involved and their relative levels of agency, but also to the power of certain ideas and 
the way they are framed (and not framed), the power of particular contexts that inhibit 
or enhance political will, and the power of particular issue characteristics (Shiffman & 
Smith, 2007). Issue frames, defined as the selection of “some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (Entman, 1993, p. 52), is 
similar to Foucault’s ideas about how power relations produce and reproduce certain 
knowledges in order to arrive at particular dominant discourses. The PPF, or the 
Shiffman and Smith framework, can be found below in Table 3C.  
 
Table 3C  
The Political Power Framework (Shiffman & Smith, 2007). 
 Description Factors shaping political priority 
Actor power The strength of 
the individuals 
1. Policy community cohesion: the degree 







individuals and organisations that are 
centrally involved with the issue at the 
global level 
2. Leadership: the presence of individuals 
capable of uniting the policy community 
and acknowledged as particularly 
strong champions for the cause 
3. Guiding institutions: the effectiveness of 
organisations or coordinating 
mechanisms with a mandate to lead the 
initiative 
4. Civil society mobilisation: the extent to 
which grassroots organisations have 
mobilised to press international and 
national political authorities to address 
the issue at the global level 
Ideas The way in which 
those involved 
with the issue 
understand and 
portray it 
5. Internal frame: the degree to which the 
policy community agrees on the 
definition of, causes of, and solutions to 
the problem 
6. External frame: public portrayals of the 
issue in ways that resonate with 
external audiences, especially the 
political leaders who control resources 




7. Policy windows: political movements 
when global conditions align favourably 
for an issue, presenting opportunities 
for advocates to influence decision 
makers 
8. Global governance structure: the degree 
to which norms and institutions 
operating in a sector provide a platform 
for effective collective action 
Issue 
characteristics 
Features of the 
problem 
9. Credible indicators: clear measures that 
show the severity of the problem and 
that can be used to monitor progress 
10. Severity: the size of the burden relative 
to other problems, as indicated by 
objective measures such as mortality 
levels 
11. Effective interventions: the extent to 
which proposed means of addressing 
the problem are clearly explained, cost 
effective, backed by scientific evidence, 
simple to implement, and inexpensive 
 
 
The interview guide (i.e. the interview questions) was based not only on the PPF, but 
also on three informal (two face-to-face and one telephone) scoping interviews 
conducted with individuals from academia and policymaking, as well as the literature. 
The interview guide can be found in annex A.  
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Key informants were recruited through a combination of purposive selection and 
snowball sampling. Their selection was dependent on, for example, whether they had 
published on resilience (e.g., policy papers), the organisations they worked for and its 
relative standing within international resilience work, the positions these individuals 
held within their respective organisations and/or their previous programmatic 
experience with resilience work. This was meant to ensure their expertise with regards 
to how the concept of resilience is used in an applied research and or policy 
implementation setting. 
The interviews were conducted either face-to-face or via Skype in the months April-July 
2016, and lasted between 30-60 minutes. At the start of the interview, the aims of the 
study were carefully explained, after which their informed consent was acquired, either 
by signing the informed consent form, or by verbally agreeing to the interview and the 
audio recording. The study information and consent form can be found in annex B and 
C, respectively. The audio-recordings of the interviews were subsequently transcribed 
verbatim for the purpose of analysis, and were analysed through a combination of 
theme-identification techniques. This entailed looking primarily for repetitions, 






  NARRATIVE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  
This chapter presents the results of the literature review. The literature searches were 
conducted in April 2016, and after a thorough selection process described in the 
previous chapter, a total of 70 articles on resilience from various academic fields were 
analysed. From the literature narratives, five major themes could be identified: what 
resilience is and the genealogy of the concept; the conceptualisation of contemporary 
risks and crises; resilience as a governance strategy; theorisation of the resilient subject; 
and finally, the future prospects and challenges of employing resilience as a rationality 
underlying responses to humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises and (in)security. 
These themes will now be discussed. 
 
4.1  What is resilience? 
With some differences in emphasis, resilience seems to be generally understood as a 
characteristic of systems, structures, organisations, communities, individuals, materials 
or biological organisms’ responses to crisis, characterised by the ability to absorb the 
shock, adapt to the new reality, and transform in order to function either as before the 
crisis (i.e. return to status quo), or, preferably, in a superior manner (see for example 
Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013; Lorenz, 2013). As Jennison (2008) asserts, resilience is not 
just about recovery with preservation of functionality, but to respond to adversity and 
“in doing so reach a higher level of functioning [emphasis added]” (p. 342). Indeed, 
Kruke and Morsut (2015) argue that systems have to implement what is learned post-
crisis into subsequent prevention and preparedness activities in order to be resilient. 
Importantly, many authors emphasise that resilience is a process, rather than an 
outcome (see for example Almedon, 2011; Bourbeau, 2013, 2015; Bouvier, 2012; 
Chandler, 2012; Frerks et al., 2011; Norris et al., 2008; Reid, 2012; Walklate, McGarry 
& Mythen, 2014; Zebrowski, 2012), illustrated by Welsh’s (2014) remark that resilience 
is about “continual adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring and renewal” 
(p. 15). 
Whereas almost all authors on resilience refer to the conceptual diversity that exists 
within both literature and practice (illustrated by the EU report Resilience in Practice), 
some actively try to clear up some of the existing ambiguities by distinguishing 
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resilience from related concepts, notably ‘resistance’ and ‘vulnerability’. Norris et al. 
(2008) for example, notes that resistance is often conceptualised as the time it takes for 
a system to break apart under pressure, whereas resilience could be seen as the time it 
takes for a system to return to an equilibrium, i.e. a stable state, after disturbance. A 
study on political violence-related trauma defines resistance as never developing 
symptoms, whereas resilience is characterised by the initial development of symptoms, 
followed by recovery to a level that indicates absence of symptoms (Hobfoll et al., 
2009). To be sure, resilience does not preclude dysfunction and distress, however, they 
are understood as temporary and followed by return to functioning, whereas persistent 
dysfunction results from vulnerability (Norris et al., 2008). As a governance rationality, 
simply not breaking under pressure or never developing symptoms may seem preferable 
to the alternative – particularly with an eye to costs. This however, becomes impossible 
in the context of a worldview where risks and crises are perceived as inevitable – a 
notion further discussed in section 3.  
Other authors specifically address resilience’s juxtaposition to vulnerability. Evans and 
Reid (2013) for example, claim that vulnerability operates as resilience’s underlying 
ontology, as a precondition for resilience, which intimately ties the two concepts 
together in an interdependent relationship. Almedon (2011) takes a slightly different 
approach and asserts that responses to crises might be characterised by either 
vulnerability or resilience, whereby the latter focuses on positive transformation rather 
than dysfunction. Miller et al. (2010) treat resilience and vulnerability as 
complementary concepts rather than competitive ones. Whereas resilience emphasises 
transformation and learning, vulnerability focuses more on power and the limits to 
individual agency – both perspectives thus have valuable contributions to make to our 
understanding of systems’ responses to crises (Miller et al., 2010). This of course 
touches upon possible de-politicisation due to a resilience approach, a critique that will 
be further explored in section 4. 
 
4.2  Genealogy of resilience  
‘Resilience’ is derived from the Latin word ‘resilio’, which means ‘to jump back’ 
(Brasset, Croft & Vaughan-Williams, 2013). Naturally, the term resilience comes with a 
variety of additional meanings inherited from the different disciplinary contexts in 
which it has been used before (Norris et al., 2008). Walker and Cooper (2011) illustrate 
this well, tracing resilience’s genealogy through the fields of engineering, socio-
ecological systems science, and psychology. They relate it in particular to the work of 
ecologist Holling and economist Hayek, whose contributions to our current 
understandings of resilience they elegantly explain (Walker & Cooper, 2011). Of course 
the differences between different ‘resiliences’ (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015; Walklate et al., 
2014) will depend on the conceptual contributions of the field (and closely related 
fields) within which it is employed. Welsh (2014) for example, explains that the 
conceptualisation of resilience differs depending on its disciplinary origins: mind-body 
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disciplines often fall back on a person-community centred conceptualisation of 
resilience, whereas nature-society disciplines are more inclined to work with a 
biophysical environment-community understanding of resilience.  
Although the concept of resilience has been widely employed at least since the 1970s 
(Walker & Cooper, 2011), the concept is relatively new in political science, 
international relations, and security studies (Bourbeau, 2013, 2015; Brasset & Vaughan-
Williams, 2015). Moreover, being well-known in disaster studies (see for example 
Adger et al., 2005; Manyena, 2006), resilience is relatively unknown in research on 
managing man-made disasters, such as political violence (including terrorist attacks) 
and armed conflict. According to Joseph (2013a), “contemporary conditions have given 
rise to certain practices of governance by which the idea of resilience finds a home … 
[resilience] has been plucked from the ecology literature and used in a fairly 
instrumental way to justify particular forms of governance which emphasise responsible 
conduct” (p. 40). Likewise, Reid (2012) asserts that the emergence of resilience in these 
fields owes to the logical link between sustainable development and neoliberal 
rationalities underlying contemporary security strategies, where the latter becomes a 
solution to the problematic inherent in the former. There is, however, unlikely to be any 
clear-cut answer as to whether resilience ideas inspired particular practices, or whether 
it was found to fit an existing set of practices –there is most likely a combination of both 
processes at play. 
The literature does not only address how resilience has been used in various disciplines 
but to some extent also tracks how resilience has been used in various risk and security 
policies by western governments and international institutions. Walker and Cooper 
(2011) for example, iterate that already in the 1990s, resilience was used by   
international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank in their risk 
strategies. A number of authors refer specifically to the use of the term by the UK 
government, for example the establishment of the London Resilience Forum in 2002, 
which inspired governments to design more anticipatory and proactive security policies 
(Coaffee & Wood, 2006; see also Coaffee, Wood & Rogers, 2009; Kaufman, 2013). In 
particular, authors refer to the UK Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 which established 
the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, as well as Local Resilience Forums and Regional 
Resilience Teams, which were really about fostering citizens’ self-organising 
capabilities in case of calamities (Brasset & Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Coaffee & 
Rogers, 2008; Welsh, 2014). Almedon (2011) asserts that the 2001 foot-and-mouth 
disease and the 9/11 attacks were the primary events that “triggered a search for 
meaning that ultimately introduced the concept of ‘national resilience’ into the English 
language” (p. 147). Nevertheless may the word as used by the British government mean 
something different in another context. Joseph (2013a) for example, argues that 
resilience is very much about the individual approach to risk within the Anglo-Saxon 
discourse, whereas in the US, resilience focuses more on private sector engagement, 
while France’s use of the concept is limited and where used, met with confusion 
(Joseph, 2013b).  
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The flourishing of resilience may in part be explained by the circulation of complexity 
and complex adaptive systems discourses (Welsh, 2014). These tend to reconstruct the 
world, thus necessitating a different response. To this, we now turn.  
 
4.3  Contemporary risks and crises  
Violent acts of terrorism, protracted crises and widespread political instability, floods, 
earthquakes and droughts set off by climate change, and global financial instability have 
engendered the idea that we “live in times of existential crisis” (European Union, 2016, 
p. 7). Resilience entered the political and public discourse exactly in times of, and 
constitutes a response to, the on-going instability and rising secularism in the Middle 
East, as well as unremitting long-standing crises in the Sahel and central Africa that act 
as catalysts not only for religious radicalisation amongst European Muslim minorities 
and tragic terror attacks in Europe, Turkey and the Middle East, but also for an 
unprecedented refugee crisis and subsequent political polarisation among European 
citizens – aptly illustrated by the Brexit and the rise of European populism. Our world is 
an increasingly dangerous one. As a response to the turbulence of our times, ‘resilience’ 
indicates a profound change in the way in which we understand the world, and 
contemporary risks and crises in particular. Much of the writing on resilience is exactly 
about the particular conception of risks and crises underlying resilience.  
First, inherent to the idea of absorbing a shock, adapting to a new reality, and 
transforming in the face of adversity, is the inevitability of contemporary risks and 
crises. In essence, resilience is not so much about prevention as it is about accepting that 
emergencies happen exactly because it is impossible to prevent them all (Bulley, 2013). 
According to Coaffee and Wood (2006), our idea of being able to defend ourselves 
revealed inadequate after the attacks on 11 September 2001, implying that risks can 
only be managed, not eradicated, as we previously thought. Indeed, as Evans and Reid 
(2014) illustrate darkly: “[r]ather than openly declaring  some vision of the future that 
overcomes the plagues of suffering engulfing the human species, what we encounter is a 
veritable landscape of projected images that is littered with the corpses of our 
catastrophes to come [emphasis added]” (p. 7). Our environment has been 
reconceptualised as terroristic, and our society as always on the brink of extinction 
(Duffield, 2011). Moving beyond a ‘utopia of safety’, “resilience preaches the 
impossibility and folly of thinking we might resist danger, and instead accept living a 
life of permanent exposure to endemic dangers” (Evans & Reid, 2013, p. 95). In a world 
that is understood as fundamentally dangerous, final security suddenly becomes 
impossible.  
Second, because risks and crises are understood as not only widespread but also 
inevitable, resilience, unsurprisingly perhaps, touches upon the idea of normality versus 
abnormality. Whereas emergencies and disasters have always been conceptualised as 
abnormal events or events that ‘break’ normality, their ubiquity is now reconceptualised 
as the normal state of affairs. Or as Duffield (2011) puts it, we have naturalised a state 
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of total war. As a result, a stable state (an equilibrium) has become the exception, 
whereas continuous disruption of a stable system, that is, disequilibrium, is the new 
normal (Frerks et al., 2011; Smith & Fischbacher, 2009). Some authors regard resilience 
as in fact the acceptance of disequilibrium as a principle of organisation (Manyena & 
Gordon, 2015; Walker & Cooper, 2011), others ask whether there are perhaps multiple 
points of equilibrium (Smith & Fischbacher, 2009), emergent equilibria (Zebrowksi, 
2012), or whether resilience constitutes the ability to move between different states of 
temporary equilibrium (Corry, 2014; Duffield, 2012). Resilience thus touches, quite 
dramatically, on our sense of what is normal; peace or war.  
Third, besides endemic, inevitable and normalised, contemporary risks and crises are 
perceived as inherently complex. Often understood as so-called ‘wicked problems’ 
(Rittel & Webbel, 1973), they are characterized by complex interdependencies, 
transcendence of geographical as well as disciplinary boundaries, and the complete 
absence of straightforward solutions. Smith and Fischbacher (2009) for example, speak 
of ‘black swans’, low probability (unpredictable) events with devastating consequences, 
much like September 11. Such events have multiple causal agents and pathways for 
transmission and transcend not just geographical borders, but also technical, political, 
and disciplinary boundaries, which proves fundamentally problematic for our silo-
mentality (Smith & Fischbacher, 2009, see also Jennison, 2008). In a profoundly 
complex world where predicting, identifying, and thus preventing risks and crises 
becomes impossible, resilience provides “a new basis for engaging uncertainty” (Dunn 
Cavelty, Kaufman & Søby Kristensen, 2015, p. 5; see also Pugh, Gabay & Williams, 
2014). Or as Aradau (2014) puts it: “surprise as inherent to our social and ecological 
systems entails a different modality of governance ... attuned to the unexpected and 
unknowable, rather than purporting to prevent, anticipate or protect against the 
unexpected and the uncertain” (p. 7). In this line of reasoning, resilience would focus on 
effects rather than causes, because causes cannot be fully understood. As a result, 
attempts to diagnose and tackle today’s problems seems to no longer be an obligation 
(Schmidt, 2015). 
Finally, risks and crises are in part unpredictable (unknowable) and complex due to the 
increasing complexities and interconnectedness of our societies. Societies’ systems are 
in constant flux in reaction to changes in other systems, which ultimately makes 
surprise more common than predictability (Norris et al., 2008). Such complexities do 
not only exacerbate the consequences of crises, but also reveal the vulnerabilities of our 
societies (Al-Khudhairy et al., 2012; Allenby & Fink, 2005; Burkle, 2011). In this way, 
emergencies have been reconceptualised as inevitable attributes of society’s internal 
functioning: emergencies do not just happen to us, but we, unconsciously, create them 
(Duffield, 2012). A good example of this is how international travel contributes to the 
spread of contagious diseases, or how urban spaces become ideal targets for man-made 
and natural disasters because of their high population density and the concentration of 
economic assets (Allenby & Fink, 2005). System efficiency (i.e. connectedness, 
interdependence) may thus decrease resilience, because if one part of the system fails, 
the whole system could come down (Norris et al., 2008). Here, ‘decoupling’ may be one 
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strategy of reducing the impact of the cascading effects of crises (Al-Khudairy et al., 
2012). As such, Evans and Reid (2014) assert that “all our castles are made from sand” 
(p. 20). In this “suspension of externality” (Schmidt, 2015, p. 409), the divide between 
the external (the crisis) and the internal (the affected subject) ceases to exist. Instead, 
they are interdependent, of not actually one and the same. This shakes the foundations 
upon which traditional conceptions of internal (i.e. national) and external (i.e. foreign) 
security rest (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015) – best illustrated by an excerpt from Frederica 
Mogherini’s foreword to the Global Strategy: “my neighbour’s and my partner’s 
weaknesses are my own weaknesses” (EU, 2016). In a similar fashion, Pugh et al. 
(2013) demonstrate that the UK is moving away from development for the moral sake 
of development, to development for the sake of the UK’s own security, arguing that ‘if 
my surroundings are peaceful, I will be peaceful’. The next sections will further 
elaborate on the collapse of the external-internal divide, and the internalisation of risks 
and emergencies. 
 
4.4  Resilience as governance  
Many authors on the subject of resilience are concerned with how resilience, as a 
rationality underlying governance of (inevitable, complex) risks and crises, plays out in 
practice, especially with regards to its profound impact on state-citizen relationships. 
Importantly, our changed understanding of contemporary risks and crises requires a new 
understanding of governance, because: “in an ontologically complex world, decisions 
must naturally acquire a different character; that is, they can no longer be conceived in 
terms of goal-oriented decisions that make a change in the world and are then to be 
accounted for and evaluated on this basis” (Schmidt, 2015, p. 407).  
As a governance rationality, resilience tends to transfer responsibility for security away 
from government and instead to (civil) society, thereby replacing traditional top-down 
structures with (seemingly) bottom-up ones (Howell, 2015a). It thus decentralizes 
power and responsibility to the locale, “inverting traditional security logics based on 
state level control” (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015, p. 87, see also Coaffee & Wood, 2006). 
Whereas in the past, the state was seen as having the ultimate duty to provide security, 
resilience instead seeks to “displace both top-down direction and attempts to 
instrumentalise market rationalities by self-reflexive constructions of bottom-up 
solutions … necessary for governance in a society which is changing fast and where 
neither the market nor the state seems capable of directing or addressing the changes 
required” (Chandler, 2014, p.7). In other words, inasmuch as governments are faced 
with the inability to provide security because they cannot control nor direct the external 
world (Chandler, 2014), citizens are tasked with organising themselves locally, in order 
to provide for their own communities’ security. Security practices are thus extended into 
everyday life (Coaffee & Rogers, 2008; Lentzos & Rose, 2009). As a consequence, 
politics are reduced to the mere “administration of life” – clearly different from the 
more traditional liberal framings of security practices as state-centric, national or 
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territorial forms of mobilization, protection, regulation (Chandler, 2013b, p. 221). Note 
however, that assigning responsibilities to citizens and communities as ‘active and 
responsible contributors to security’ rather than the institutions of the state (Ewards, 
2009; Reid, 2012; Welsh, 2014), conflicts with the problematisation of society as the 
architect of its own risks and crises (Dunn Cavelty et al, 2015). 
It is perhaps unsurprising that in the light of this shift from state-based to society-based 
understandings of security practices (Chandler, 2012), resilience has been passionately 
critiqued for its neoliberal character (see for example Chandler 2013a; 2013b; Duffield, 
2012; Joseph, 2013a; Reid, 2012; Rogers, 2013). In addition, it is not unfathomable that 
in a time where not only the state is perceived as being unable to provide security (due 
to the inevitability of risks and crises), but where states are also faced with a depletion 
of funds, that delegating responsibility to citizens is killing two birds with one stone. 
The EU Approach to Resilience for example, argues that resilience is a cost-effective 
strategy, not only better for the people involved, but also cheaper (EU, 2012). This 
logically prompts the question whether resilience is not just a rationale underlying 
necessary budget cuts.  
Howell (2015a) reminds us though that interpreting resilience as serving austerity fails 
to take resilience serious enough, and moreover, that the responsibilisation argument not 
only betrays a nostalgia for the welfare state, but also treats governance as a very top-
down process. Instead, Howell (2015b) argues, resilience is about both optimisation as 
well as reducing costs. In a similar fashion, Schmidt (2015) argues that the neoliberal 
critique ignores resilience’s “positive agenda and … empowering promise” (p. 404), 
and that the concept should instead be understood as a response to neoliberalism’s 
inherent frustrations, rather than a continuation of it. Corry (2014) argues that using 
neoliberalism to explain resilience, in fact obscures the varieties of articulations of 
resilience as well as the complexity of its normative implications. Moreover, these 
authors “appear to make the mistake of equating a particular government’s use of 
resilience with the concept of resilience. In doing so, these scholars run the risk of 
reproducing what they seek to criticize, that is, the intention and capacity of states to 
dictate the terms of debate and to define how a concept should be understood and 
employed” (Bourbeau, 2015, p. 379). 
Joseph (2014) for example, conceptualises resilience not as states absolving themselves 
from the responsibility for their citizens’ safety, but as ‘regulation from a distance’ (see 
for a more critical account Duffield, 2012). The EU for example, encourages 
responsible behaviour through an emphasis on ownership, partnership and peer review 
in its Supporting Horn of African Resilience (SHARE) and l’Alliance Globale pour 
l’Initiative Résilience Sahel (AGIR) projects (Joseph, 2014). As such, citizens are not 
completely left to their own devices, but rather, states ‘nudge’ (Chandler, 2013b; 
Coaffee, 2013) citizens towards self-organization and control through protocols, in 
some sort of ‘regulated self-organisation’ (Kaufman, 2013). There is an interesting 
dilemma here. One the one hand, crises are unknowable – which implies that responses 
to crises can only be emergent, i.e. take form as the crisis unfolds – yet on the other 
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hand, the form such responses should take are nevertheless prescribed in protocols. 
Pilav (2012) rightly wonders how spontaneous behaviour can be planned before crisis 
strikes. She illustrates the creativity of citizen responses to the challenges they faced 
during the siege of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina, like building makeshift ‘walls’ 
between buildings in order to limit snipers’ visibility (ibid). This implies that resilience 
cannot simply be imposed from above, but must be cultivated from the ground up, by 
individuals, companies, communities (Flynn, 2011). Otherwise, Chandler (2012) 
argues, resilience is nothing more than (external) interventions reconceptualised as 
empowerment. Indeed, Rogers (2013) asserts that whereas resilience has the potential of 
being a bottom-up enabling metaphor, it is currently merely a tool of management.  
 
4.5  The resilient subject  
Resilience, as a mode of governance, has implications for the kind of subjectivities it 
purports to create, characterised by vigilance, entrepreneurship, de-politicisation, and 
responsibilisation for non-resilient outcomes. In the scholarly analyses of what 
resilience demands of the subject of governance, it becomes clear that resilience is in 
fact a normative concept (Chandler, 2012). Its focus on the individual is a particular 
feature of (west) European governance however, and may be different for other parts of 
the world (Joseph, 2013a). 
First, authors argue that not only do we, as a ‘truth’, live in an increasingly dangerous 
world, resilience requires its subjects to be aware of the dangers it is surrounded with. It 
means to “accept that one is fundamentally vulnerable” (Evans & Reid, 2013, p. 84), 
and, subsequently, to constantly prepare for, adapt to, and live with a spectrum of 
possible – yet unknowable – risks (Brasset et al., 2013; Duffield, 2011). This emphasis 
on being prepared for the worst comes down to, according to Duffield (2012), and 
Lentzos and Rose (2009), an instrumentalisation of fear – where fear is used to force 
citizens to not only be prepared for, but also have the ability to quickly return to normal 
or improved functioning following a crisis. Moreover, when faced with a perpetual 
sense of danger and uncertainty, state leaders’ claims that they are keeping citizens safe, 
may seem more credible (Coaffee et al., 2009). In practice, such a rhetoric of imminent 
danger often encourages citizens to report anything they find suspicious (Coaffee & 
Fussey, 2015), effectively creating micro-vigilantes of all of us, where we are tasked to 
“police our locales in a manner which complements the outsourcing logic of neoliberal 
governance” (Evans & Reid, 2014, p. 91). Fearfulness may also lead to societies being 
more accepting of pervasive security technologies, yet important questions of how this 
sense of danger would or does impact on social relations within society (Malcolm, 
2013), or how resilience as being fearful constructs freedom and un-freedom (Lentzos 
& Rose, 2009), remain unanswered. 
Second, the resilient subject is not only expected to live with the idea that disaster, with 
its possible devastating consequences, could strike at any moment, (s)he is also required 
to see this imminent danger as an opportunity: after all, learning emanates from 
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exposure (Rogers, 2013). Going one step further, resilience not only renders it 
unnecessary to try and ‘solve’ risks and crises (as that is impossible), but it actively 
promotes an understanding of risks and crises as opportunities under a sort of neo-
Darwinist presumption that “‘Keeping out of harm’s way’ (something Don Quixote 
preached but never practised, hence his longevity) may be harmful” (Wildavsky, 1988, 
p. 763). Indeed, only through exposure to uncertainty, one can develop the “desirable 
attributes of foresight, enterprise, and self-reliance” and as a result, “the ability to 
change and adapt becomes a virtue in itself” (Duffield, 2011, p. 757). Resilience then 
reconceptualises agency from shaping the external environment, to changing inner life 
through learning from exposure (Schmidt, 2015). In the EU’s Action Plan for Resilience 
in Crisis Prone Countries, this is described as “an opportunity for transformation, in 
terms of adaptation to changing environments, empowerment, improved livelihoods and 
economic opportunities” (European Commission, 2013, p. 3). Schmidt (2015) 
summarises resilience as “adaptive (self-)governance [that] can emerge as the new 
promise of empowerment: agential capacities to turn inner lives and inner workings into 
the site of effective, intentional and transformative agency based on the stimuli received 
from environments one is embedded into” (p. 420). Although this focus on strengths 
and capacities rather than social dysfunction resembles aspects from positive 
psychology (Almedon, 2011), ‘embracing risk’ and ‘thriving on chaos’ (O’Malley, 
2010) are not unproblematic constructs. It may feel embarrassing to talk about positive 
experiences and resilience in situations in which people strive to survive in appalling 
conditions, sometimes victims of inhumane and degrading treatment, or extreme 
violence (Bouvier, 2012). Indeed, the idea that disasters represent an opportunity to 
‘build back better’ may be difficult to convey to those who have lost everything due to a 
crisis, and legitimately so – especially when it concerns man-made disasters. Moreover, 
if resilience presupposes the necessity and positivity of human exposure to danger 
(Evans & Reid, 2013), does that mean that we, in order to learn, have to expose 
ourselves to danger? In this way, resilience risks becoming a neo-Darwinist measure of 
the fitness to survive (Duffield, 2012; Walker & Cooper, 2011). It is nevertheless 
important to remember that although resilient functioning is constructed as uncommon, 
dysfunction is often rarer than one might think (Barber & Doty, 2013; Walklate et al., 
2014).  
Third, resilience is postulated as a learnable skill rather than a natural characteristic; as 
human attributes reconfigured into coping strategies and skills that can be learned by 
anyone, making resilience “a technology of the self that can be both learnt and taught” 
(Duffield, 2012, p. 487). This is well-demonstrated by some authors’ critiques on 
military resilience training (see for example Howell, 2012; 2015b; O’Malley, 2010; 
Walklate et al., 2014), which, although meant to prevent soldiers from developing 
(symptoms of) post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), de facto responsibilises them for 
their own mental wellbeing. As a consequence, the moral basis upon which veterans can 
claim healthcare entitlements disappears (Howell, 2015b). Problematic in this 
conceptualization is that if resilience can be learned, it can also be failed to learn. This 
makes subjects responsible for their own vulnerabilities—regardless of whether these 
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are the product of their inherent weaknesses, or of socio-economic and political 
inequalities. To be more precise, responsibilising people for their resilience is de facto 
the same as responsibilising people for their vulnerabilities (Bulley, 2013). Chandler 
(2013a) argues that resilience as such ideologically affirms the responsibility of non-
western societies for their own threats and insecurities, disregarding any role that 
western governments might have played in the instability of their societies. In this case, 
resilience risks becoming an apologia for the limits of international intervention, with 
the limits being reconceptualised as internal products of the societies that are being 
intervened upon (ibid). Going one step further, resilience risks responsibilising societies 
for political violence and armed conflict of which they have become victims. 
Finally, and building on the above, resilience has a profoundly depoliticizing effect 
(Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015). The resilient subject, according to Chandler and Reid 
(2016), is one that “must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world: not a 
subject that can conceive of changing the world” (p. 53). After all, we are no longer in 
control due to the changed understanding of contemporary risks and crises – our only 
choice is to adapt to the conditions of our suffering (Reid, 2012). Because the state 
cannot promise security, the resilient subject does not look to states to secure their 
wellbeing – they have been disciplined into believing the necessity to secure it from 
themselves (Reid, 2012). As such, resilience “withdraws from the promise [of security] 
as it disavows the transformative capacity of collective political action and remains 
hostage to the limits of knowledge” (Aradau, 2014). As a result, resilience adds up to a 
degradation of political capacities (Reid, 2012), exactly because decisions become non-
decisions in the political sense: they are detached from changing reality in favour of 
establishing a certain future (Schmidt, 2015). Chandler argues that if social reality 
comes down to a product of choice (i.e. to be resilient or non-resilient) rather than 
external structures open to understanding and transformation, freedom and choice 
become meaningless, and indeed choice becomes a mechanism for allocating blame 
(Chandler, 2013b). In his study on internationally displaced persons (IDP) and refugee 
camps, Ilcan & Rygiel (2015) argue that resilience works disempowering exactly 
because IDPs and refugees are encouraged to resign themselves to their new reality – 
rather than demanding political change and mobility. Resilience is ultimately about 
adaptation within the system, rather than system change (ibid). While an individual’s 
inherent traits interact with its context, research across disciplines shows clearly, that 
the search for human capacity in the face of adversity should focus on the 
“(compromised) availability of social, economic, educational, cultural, and political 
resources that all individuals … need to move forward with their lives” (Barber & Doty, 
2013, p. 247). Resilience nevertheless conveniently precludes challenges to the systems 
and institutions in which the individual is located (de Lint & Shazal, 2013), diverting 
attention away from questions of power and justice, or the type of futures that can be 





4.6  A future for resilience? 
One might consider the academic literature on resilience, in the in the context of 
responses to humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises and (in)security connected to 
political violence and armed conflict, to be rather critical, especially with regards to 
what resilience presupposes about the nature of contemporary risks and crises, and how 
we, as citizens, are supposed to act upon them. Despite these critical readings of 
resilience, the concept also has a number of positive attributes, which could form a basis 
for further engagement with this novel concept.  
On a very practical level for example, resilience is abstract and malleable enough to 
incorporate different worlds (Walker & Cooper, 2011), enabling new practices and 
forms of cooperation. According to Duffield (2012), resilience is a ‘lingua franca’ – a 
common language able to effectively cross disciplinary boundaries. Pospisil and Kühn 
(2016) for example, illustrate how resilience has provided a common ground for donors 
to engage with BRICS countries and other ‘non-traditional donors’ (e.g. Turkey, 
Indonesia, the Gulf States). In the Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 
for example, the EU asserts that achieving resilience “requires all EU actors 
(humanitarian, development, political) to work differently and more effectively 
together” (European Commission, 2013, p. 4) – actors that historically have been 
significantly separated along ideological, institutional and financial lines. Indeed, 
resilience is a convening concept with a brokering capacity “to bring people 
(practitioners, policy makers), organizations with different initial agendas, and 
communities of practice from different sectors, together around the same table with the 
unique objective of ‘strengthening resilience’” (Béné et al., 2012, p. 45). As radical 
multi-disciplinarity (Duffield, 2012), resilience represents a new way of thinking that 
creates opportunities to think more creatively about hybrid solutions and to build on 
what already exists (de Weijer, 2013). As a universal imperative, resilience has the 
capacity to transcend differences and provide a unifying rationale for greater 
international cooperation (Flynn, 2011). Still, other buzzwords acting as ‘lingua francas’ 
(like ‘sustainable development’, ‘human security’) have preceded resilience, and it 
remains to be seen whether resilience will truly bring about tangible changes in the way 
that wicked problems are addressed by the international community, or whether it is just 
another popular but short-lived word, bound to disappear as quickly as it advanced. 
The (ongoing) ambiguity around resilience is not due to conceptual obscurity or a 
product of diverse genealogies (Zebrowski, 2012), but because, resilience in abstraction 
might mean as little as an ontological fact (Schmidt, 2015, p. 419) or “a capacity of life 
itself” (Evans & Reid, p. 33). That is, until we start asking ‘resilience to what?’, 
‘resilience of whom?’, and ‘resilience by what means? This demonstrates that as a 
concept, resilience is fluid enough to be applied in various contexts, adapted to different 
institutional visions, and translated into diverse strategies. Yet because of this 
flexibility, resilience does run the risk of becoming a “monotone characteristic of 
everything” (Duffield, 2012), a catch-all phrase or container concept. Yet only so, when 
we continue to understand resilience as having a unitary, uniform understanding (which 
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must yet be found or agreed upon), rather than as a variety of ‘resiliences’ (Coaffee & 
Fussey, 2015; Walklate et al., 2014). When we understand resilience as highly context 
and issue specific (Prior & Hagmann, 2014) and thus necessarily requiring a different 
interpretation depending on what it refers to, we avert the danger of resilience becoming 
an empty signifier – filled with any meaning to justify whichever goal (Weichselgartner 
& Kelman, 2014).  
Although the international community has long struggled with making their practices 
more inclusive, resilience has the potential to revive the push for a recognition of local 
communities and civil society organizations’ in-depth knowledge of ‘the field’. This is 
crucial to help tailor policies and practices to the situation on the ground, in particular 
for conflict-affected states, which are more diverse and complex than any other group of 
countries (Levine & Mosel, 2014). Local ownership is crucial to the success of any 
resilience-building activity, because, as Chandler asserts: “Changing or adapting 
behaviour and understandings need to come from within; resilience cannot be ‘given’ or 
‘produced’ by outside actors, only facilitated or inculcated through understanding the 
mechanisms through which problematic social practices are reproduced” (Chandler, 
2013a, p. 277). To some extent this is already happening by placing national plans and 
national decision-making central to emergency response (see for example the Jordan 
Response Plan for the Syria Crisis, which is led by Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation). Likewise, in Ryan’s (2012) assessment of UNDP’s 
Infrastructures for Peace programme, resilience recognises and respects people’s 
agency, institutions and systems,  as it enhances the capacities of poor/fragile states to 
deal with, and overcome, the circumstances that block their development. The question 
is however, what are the grassroots level factors that contribute to individuals’/ 
communities’ resilience, let alone how can we strengthen them. Ager, Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh and Ager (2015) for example, studied the role of local faith communities in 
resilient emergency responses, but asserts that such community structures are often 
overlooked. 
Despite resilience’s inherent emphasis on local capacities, Coaffee and Rogers (2008) 
note the absence of citizen voices in the resilience discourse, where ‘the citizen’ is 
constructed as a passive recipient of information in a process dominated by a specialist 
consortium of experts. Here, we are confronted with a gap between what resilience 
preaches, and how it plays out in practice. If resilience is really about inclusion, it’s 
important to start including citizens in a meaningful way (Coaffee & Rogers, 2008) – if 
not, resilience remains just as much a top-down governance exercise as its liberal 
predecessors. Likewise, if resilience is really about providing a sustainable solution to 
contemporary risks and crises, programmes should start addressing the core structural 
factors that increase people’s risks (Williams, 2013). Yet this touches again upon 
system structure, an issue raised in the previous section. As such, if resilience 
naturalises a state of crises (Duffield, 2011) in order to direct our attention towards the 
immediate event (i.e. terrorist attack, earthquake) rather than every day’s structural 
violence, or the so-called ‘liquid evil’ so pervasive as to almost become invisible 
(Bauman & Donskis, 2016), we are posed with a much bigger problematic. Namely that 
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resilience adds up to an abandonment of ideology in favour of pragmatism – as a 
‘capitulation to complexity’ (Pospisil & Kühn, 2016) – one that renders structure 
negotiated by existing power relations invisible. Weichselgartner and Kelman (2014) 
however, notes that resilience thinking is taking a turn towards more transformative 
notions of resilience, which will force it to deal with the notions of equity, power, 
justice, social capital, and so on. This is important in particular because resilience’s 
potential is to decrease disparities between those who have/have not, and those who 
survive/survive not by increasing protective factors and decreasing risk factors 
(Jennison, 2008). 
Resilience, as it stands, leaves us with more questions than answers. The concept is 
significantly under-theorised (Bourbeau, 2013; Brasset et al., 2013), although both 
academic and practitioner analyses are slowly but surely building up the concept’s 
resume. The accounts of what resilience amounts to, are quite problematic, even though 
its use in global policies in the context of humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises 
and (in)security more broadly, is significant. At the same time, measurement of 
resilience is not only a technical, but also a political challenge (Prior & Hagmann, 
2014), which further problematizes its current widespread use. We now turn to the 
accounts of practitioners, and how they make sense of resilience in their daily usage of 
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This chapter presents the results of the key informant interviews. Between April and 
July 2016, thirteen in-depth semi-structured key informant interviews were conducted 
with representatives from various international governmental, inter-governmental, and 
non-governmental organisations with programmes focused on resilience. From their 
narratives, four major themes could be identified: the rise of resilience as a concept in 
policies dealing with (international) responses to humanitarian emergencies, protracted 
crises and (in)security more broadly, resilience as an answer to contemporary (global) 
challenges, the characteristics of a resilience approach and what it entails, and finally, 
the gains and challenges relating to the use of ‘resilience’ as a guiding rationality thus 
far. These themes will now be discussed.  
 
5.1  The rise of resilience 
The first major theme concerns the dynamic processes through which resilience has 
become a prominent concept in current responses to contemporary humanitarian 
emergencies, protracted crises and insecurity. Interviewees shared their perspectives 
about how and by whom the concept of resilience had been used previously, from 
whom it received support, the processes through which buzzwords – words that 
(temporarily) enjoy immense popularity – generally emerge, and the particular appeal of 
the qualities understood to be inherent to the concept of resilience.  
First, interviewees were noticeably united in their assessment that whereas the word 
resilience itself may not have been used extensively before, the concept does not offer 
completely new ideas, nor does it represent a mere re-packaging of established practices 
or ‘old wine in new bottles’. Earlier concepts from the humanitarian and developments 
fields, like (sustainable) livelihoods, capacity development, and linking relief, 
rehabilitation and development (LRRD) have provided the inspiration for, and the ideas 
underlying, the concept of resilience. Thus, resilience includes ideas from all these 
previous concepts, combined into something new. As such, resilience is really 
understood as being concerned with building on lessons learned and ‘doing business 
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differently’. There was some disagreement between interviewees however about 
whether ‘doing business differently’ meant improving, strengthening and systematising 
current practices, or that it constitutes an entirely different way of working, as the 
following excerpts show:  
“It’s different actors, it’s different commitments, so it’s not just... I would 
argue it’s... not just filling a gap between relief and development, doing 
business very differently means erasing one paradigm and moving on to 
something else” (Development Coordinator, inter-governmental 
organisation, interview 1). 
“...it’s not necessarily new, it’s about improving ... and building ... on the 
good things that have been done, because there’s a lot of good things that 
have happened. So, it’s building on those things and building on the lessons 
that we’ve learned ... so it’s ... much more about the strengthening of the 
way in which we’re working” (Advisor, inter-governmental organisation, 
interview 13). 
This divide seems to refer to resilience as a ‘new’ rationality underlying governance 
(hence the word ‘paradigm’) on the one hand, and, in more practical terms, to resilience 
as a technical approach, or a ‘way of working’. This may then add up to resilience being 
a strengthening of current practices guided by what is considered a ‘new’ or different 
way of thinking, albeit inspired by previous theory and practice. 
Interviewees could nevertheless point to particular organisations within the international 
community or specific influential reports that have brought resilience to the fore. 
Almost all interviewees explicitly mentioned the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) and its Humanitarian Response Review of 2011, 
and, albeit to a lesser extent, the work on resilience done by the European Commission 
and the United Nations, as having played a role in resilience’s rise to the global political 
agenda. 
Second, interviewees asserted that not only was resilience supported by politicians from 
donor governments and western-based (inter-governmental) donor organisations, 
politicians and policymakers were also resilience’s biggest advocates. The following 
quote illustrates this by showing at what level the word ‘resilience’ is used:  
“...it suited governments, it suited the kind of language ... good... for 
political terms, for politicians, for people like ... the top-ranking 
bureaucrats, and ... the UN .... And you see it being repeated all the time, I 
mean ..., Obama was giving a speech ... two or three weeks ago, and it had 
the word resilience all over it” (Independent Consultant, inter-governmental 
organisation, interview 4). 
Some interviewees nevertheless added concerns about high-level government officials’ 
unequivocal support for resilience, noticing that inquiries into resilience focused on the 
technical details of its implementation, rather than the idea as a strategy itself:  
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“...sometimes I have the feeling in the policy debate resilience isn’t even 
questioned, it’s just like, this is a great thing, it’s out there, we need to 
implement it, resilience has to be done ... The question is rather ... how is it 
implemented in a way that ... allows ... for the best possible outcome” 
(Senior Researcher, independent research institute, interview 10).  
Third, almost all interviewees saw resilience as a buzzword, and in their understanding 
of how resilience arrived at its contemporary popularity, many referred to processes that 
may not be specific to resilience, but rather to the emergence of buzzwords in general. 
The most important of these is a so-called ‘bandwagon effect’ – the phenomenon in 
which the uptake of beliefs, ideas, and words increases the more they are adopted by 
others. Interviewees explained that once heads of state and donors started talking about 
resilience – from where the primary push for resilience originated – NGOs were then 
compelled to follow by adopting the term in order for their projects to be funded, as the 
following quotes illustrate:  
“At one point, everyone was talking about resilience. Very quickly. So, if 
you wanted to be in, if you wanted to count, if you wanted to show the 
language, that you are relevant, you couldn’t refrain from using the word” 
(Head of Programme, think tank, interview 7 [Translated from Dutch]).  
“...it’s a term that ... certainly two, three years ago was ... super high on 
everyone’s agenda, and no project proposal would ever be funded by 
anyone without the word resilience in it” (Officer, inter-governmental 
organisation, interview 12). 
Most interviewees seemed not very critical of these processes, but seemed to resign 
themselves to the fact that organisations have to adhere to donor demands, that this is 
just ‘the way it is’. At the same time, interviewees also recognised a certain element of 
chance or randomness that is perceived to play a role in how buzzwords come into 
currency. Some interviewees asserted that we might have ended up with a word other 
than resilience, even if the ideas underlying a new approach would have been the same. 
One interviewee even referred to the butterfly effect – the idea that small causes may 
have immense effects: 
“...there’s this thing about the butterfly... you know, what I’m talking about, 
if the butterfly hadn’t flapped its wings it wouldn’t have been, I think there’s 
some of that going on. Because that’s the way the world works, if one 
person hadn’t said something in one room to one person ... we might have 
ended up with a different word” (Research fellow, think tank, Expert 
interview 8). 
“It might as well have been another term. If ‘livelihoods’ hadn’t been used 
before, perhaps that would have become the new buzzword” (Head of 
Programme, think tank, interview 7 [Translated from Dutch]). 
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These excerpts imply that interviewees ascribe more value to the ideas underlying a 
buzzword than the buzzword itself. That may nevertheless be problematic, if the 
underlying ideas differ per organisations, government, and so on, especially when a 
buzzword is meant to streamline cross-cutting issues over various sectors and fields.  
Finally, and not unimportantly, the concept of resilience is understood to have an 
undeniable appeal that has sparked its sudden and sharp increase in popularity among a 
wide variety of actors. Interviewees first of all referred to the intrinsic positivity of the 
term: it is solution-focused and forward-looking rather than problem-focused and 
backward-looking. Interviewees were quick to ascertain that this is not to say that in 
practice, resilience ignores the underlying causes of crises, a critique that will be further 
explored in section 4 of this chapter. One interviewee, in comparing resilience to the 
concept of fragility, summed up that particular elements within the concept of resilience 
may appeal to different actors:  
“...on the donor-side ... it’s attractive because it intuitively makes sense, and 
it feeds into value for money, on the recipient country side ... it’s ... forward-
looking and it’s positive ... rather than [fragility, which is] sort of 
backward-looking ... and maybe has an overlay of potential blame” (Policy 
Advisor, inter-governmental organisation interview 11). 
In addition to its perceived inherent positivity, there is an assumed element of logic in 
the concept of resilience. Not only in terms of cost-effectiveness (which will be further 
explored in section 3 of this chapter), but primarily because resilience is about 
improving responses to crises – natural disasters, violent conflict, terrorist attacks, and 
so on: 
“I will sit in my little village and think about how do we develop, how do we 
live better lives? How do we deal with the next drought? It’s a very 
legitimate concern ... The concern is legitimate, the approach is legitimate, 
and it actually touches on some basic human needs ... Homo sapiens ... are 
designed a little bit to deal with issues and overcome the issues and move on 
with their lives. You ... have an animal facing you, you run, your body’s 
designed to produce adrenaline to make you run faster, so you escape the 
animal that’s chasing you ... so to some degree it’s even built into our DNA, 
this idea of we want a better life and we want to be able to deal with 
whatever life throws our way” (Independent Consultant, inter-governmental 
organisation, interview 4). 
In the excerpt above, resilience is compared to, or explained to play into, an 






5.2  Resilience as an answer to contemporary challenges 
The second major theme concerns the contemporary challenges to which resilience is 
understood to be an answer. As such, the concept can be understood as, on the one hand 
a specific technical approach to deal with what are understood to be the global 
challenges of our time, i.e., a particular understanding of protracted crises, while on the 
other hand a strategy to address the intrinsic weakness of the current international 
security, humanitarian, and development system through which protracted crises are 
addressed.  
The first challenge pertains to how institutions, organisations, communities, and 
individuals involved in the global governance of protracted crises understand the nature 
of contemporary fragile contexts. In essence, interviewees understood contemporary 
crises to be somehow different from crises in the past, with regards to their temporality 
(frequency, duration, recurrence) and their complexity: 
“...the nature of crises has changed whereby ... crises don’t end anymore, in 
a way. Once they’re open, they’re open, and they stay open and they 
expand, and what not. Becoming much more entrenched and political ... and 
protracted” (Officer, inter-governmental organisation, interview 12). 
Moreover, some interviewees touched upon the idea of contemporary crises’ normalcy – 
the view that instead of perceiving crisis as an abnormal event, it is seen as a normal 
part of life, i.e. that crises will happen inevitably:  
“...shocks and stressors [are] being seen as outside the normal development 
progression rather than being seen as actually you know, a normal part of 
life ... And then I think when we do that, you start [to] get to a more 
functional context, rather than a big idea” (Policy Officer, inter-
governmental organisation, interview 3). 
Such a view of crises as inevitable and (also) recurrent, obviously puts a much greater 
emphasis on the need for preparedness than perhaps has been the case before.  
When discussing the nature of contemporary crises, interviewees repeatedly referred to 
the significant growth of humanitarian needs over the last decade and the sheer overload 
of cases. This has subsequently sparked a reflection on the second theme; the 
effectiveness, sustainability, and appropriateness of the current international system. 
Indeed, our altered understanding of contemporary crises has exposed the intrinsic 
weaknesses of the international system’s global governance of protracted crises, 
including, but not limited to, a lack of progress in terms of outcomes, the exclusion of 
national actors, siloed financial structures that are ill-fitted to catering to contemporary 
humanitarian needs and perhaps most importantly, the humanitarian-development 
nexus. The acknowledgement of these systemic weaknesses, has ushered security, 




First, interviewees were critical of the current international aid system and questioned it 
either in its entirety, or in particular its effectiveness in terms of outcomes: 
“I think at the same time also too, there has been a growing sense [which 
was expressed during the] World Humanitarian Summit, in May ... that the 
humanitarian system is sort of increasingly, eh, challenged let’s say, if not 
broken” (Policy Advisor, inter-governmental organisation, interview 11).  
“...we realise now that we’re getting better as humanitarian actors, but 
we’re not becoming better in terms of the outcomes. The outcomes are the 
same, and we have to make sure that we somehow do something different so 
that the outcome is different as well. So that we can actually can get out of 
the job in a way” (Officer, inter-governmental organisation, interview 12). 
Clearly, different actors within the international system view these systemic challenges 
in varying degrees of pessimism, but there nevertheless existed a general sense among 
interviewees that aid and assistance has not helped people become less vulnerable so as 
to be able to respond to crises resiliently – thus necessitating a different approach. In 
addition, interviewees questioned the appropriateness of traditional aid objectives, i.e. 
the provision of the most basic humanitarian services, such as shelter, food, and water:    
“[In a refugee camp] you’re not allowed [to work], you’re not allowed to 
trade your skills, you’re not only vulnerable by definition, you’re... the 
international system that’s constructed to keep you vulnerable. After six 
years to keep you living on a subsistence allowance. So yes, certainly, the 
resilience response challenges that fundamentally” (Development 
Coordinator, inter-governmental organisation, interview 1).  
While there is an undeniable need for basic humanitarian services in protracted crises, 
interviewees perceived these as being largely insufficient, and in the long term possibly 
detrimental to people’s resilience by creating a passive dependency rather than a 
proactive resourcefulness. As such, it could be said that insofar resilience is understood 
to (also) refer to populations’ ability to find solutions for the challenges they face, 
current international responses like humanitarian aid may actually be counterproductive 
if the goal is building people’s resilience.  
Second, and related to the above, there is a concern that current approaches tend to 
sidestep national decision-making processes rather than seeing them as central to 
protracted crises governance. There were slight differences of opinion, where some 
interviewees emphasised that the international system failed to provide national 
governments with their rightful place in decision-making processes, and others felt that 
international organisations rather tended to relieve states of their duties, while appeasing 
the population and thus providing only temporary solutions that perpetuate rather than 
solve problems:    
“[International organisations] sometimes take the place of the state [by] 
providing what the state is supposed to provide. So they allow the state to 
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continue doing whatever it does without accountability ... I think the 
problem with international organisations is that when [they] start providing 
services, they pacify the community. And ... it gives [the community] ... 
immediate solutions to protracted problems. Because, you dig them a well 
today, they will still have a water problem [tomorrow] so, you [are] just 
going to dig another well, and [are] just going to create different problems, 
because ... your solution is a problem in the future” (Senior Programme 
Officer, non-governmental organisation, interview 2).  
What the current international system entails or ‘does’ is thus perceived as quite 
problematic in that it does not address issues sustainably, and instead, runs the risk of 
exacerbating problems rather than solving them.  
Third, the current financial structures of the international aid system are perceived as ill-
fitted to cater to contemporary humanitarian needs. Interviewees primarily identified a 
significant need for multi-year humanitarian programming and financing, as well as 
substantial structural challenges that thwart a move towards longer-term humanitarian 
financing instruments: 
“USAID for instance has some multi-year humanitarian planning, but for 
USAID ... to move to multi-year humanitarian financing is almost 
impossible. Because ... humanitarian financing in the US is requested by 
congress every year ... through a legislative process, so trying to address 
that sort of ... I mean it’s really starting to address the architecture of the 
state ... to change that, so it’s very difficult” (Policy Advisor, inter-
governmental organisation, interview 11).  
Finally, next to financial structures, the major perceived weakness of the current 
international system was the so-called ‘humanitarian-development nexus’: the fact that 
relief aid and development assistance are ideologically, institutionally, and functionally 
two completely separate worlds that rarely seem to interact (which applies to other 
fields as well, such as security). This nexus is dramatically illustrated by the following 
quote:   
“...for the first time we had to sit at the same table with the humanitarians, 
and they had to explain to us the kind of work that they do. And we had to 
explain to them the kind of work that we do, and ... we were both quite alien 
to each other, I mean, it was interesting, and we learned a lot. But we exist 
in two different spheres” (Independent Consultant, inter-governmental 
organisation, interview 4). 
With contemporary crises understood as being longer-term and increasingly complex, 
humanitarian organisations – which traditionally provide immediate, short-term 
lifesaving services – in particular, will find their tools insufficient for their necessary 
long-term presence:  
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“...the humanitarian tools and services that we have that are really for 
short-term surge ... they’re not really working for long-term presence. So, 
again, in a case like Dadaab [refugee camp in Kenya] we’ve been there for 
25 years but a lot of the tools that we’re using are single-year fundraising, 
single-year contracts for the staff who are running it, it’s single-year 
everything” (Officer, inter-governmental organisation, interview 12). 
“...in those protracted crises, I think the humanitarian system has been 
pushed into taking on roles that it was not necessarily designed to do. I 
mean, the humanitarian system was designed as really a six-week response 
mechanism ... the humanitarian system is now in the situation where it is 
expected pretty much to provide parallel service provision to people who 
are displaced on average now for seventeen years. So you’re talking about 
generational service provision. Which is being provided by a system, that 
was not set up to do that, that was set up to provide immediate relief, meet 
immediate needs, and then hand over, if you like, to the development system 
or to the national... development system more broadly, and by development 
system, I mean international assistance, or government, or private sector ... 
and that hasn’t happened in protracted crises, in particular” (Policy 
Advisor, inter-governmental organisation, interview 11). 
These interview excerpts address a deep problematic specific to the humanitarian relief 
arm of international protracted crisis governance, which is its short-term approach and 
mechanisms for what is increasingly becoming long-term work. Interviewees brought to 
the fore that protracted crises in particular, due to their nature, necessitate certain forms 
of cooperation between humanitarian actors, i.e. the shorter-term relief work that 
addresses immediate needs, and development actors, i.e. longer-term work that 
addresses the (political) drivers of vulnerability, because:   
“...why they’re saying that the aid system is broken, [is] because all these 
different parts are not working well together to be able to reduce the overall 
needs” (Officer, inter-governmental organisation, interview 12). 
The interview narratives indicate that whereas humanitarian and development work 
have always been separated, over the last decade or so this has become not only 
problematic, but has also become to be perceived as one of the main reasons for 
populations’ sustained vulnerability and regions’ continued and increasing fragility. 
Perhaps surprisingly, specific challenges relating to the cooperation with or between 
other actors, such as security actors (e.g., peacekeeping missions) or the private sector 
were not explicitly mentioned. Nevertheless, whichever form humanitarian-






5.3  The resilience approach 
The third major theme concerns interviewees’ perceptions of what the concept of 
resilience actually ‘does’ in practice. What does a ‘resilience approach’ or even 
resilience-based governance mean in practice? According to the interviewees, a 
resilience approach can be characterised by a number of characteristics, and by a 
specific form of humanitarian-development in particular.  
First of all, an important aspect of the resilience approach is the realisation that 
humanitarian relief and development are not linear processes – i.e., relief and 
development phases do not follow each other in a linear fashion. Reality is messier than 
that. Exactly because protracted crises are complex, recurrent and long-term, a 
sequenced approach might not be appropriate, and instead, a combination of relief, 
rehabilitation and development activities should occur simultaneously, in a so-called 
‘contiguum’ rather than a continuum approach:  
“...we have learned some critical lessons, so, one for example is that it’s not, 
you know, a continuum, it’s a contiguum, and it’s a very much a ... back and 
forth, it’s not just relief leads to recovery leads to development, it’s much 
more complex than that and it’s about having development and 
humanitarian at the same time, in the same places, targeting the same 
people” (Advisor, inter-governmental organisation, interview 13). 
As such, insofar as current approaches are supposed to take place along a relief-
development-recovery continuum, more recent understanding is that the context or 
reality on the ground – i.e., the protracted crisis – demands a more iterative approach in 
which relief, development and recovery phases overlap. It is not impossible that in 
practice, this is already happening as exact points at which one phase ends and the next 
begins may be difficult to determine. 
In addition, resilience approaches tend to focus explicitly on the poorest and most 
vulnerable members of populations affected by protracted crises – corresponding to the 
battle cry ‘leave no one behind’ of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, and the 
‘furthest behind first’ anthem of the Sustainable Development Goals. The idea 
underlying this focus on the most vulnerable, seems to be, according to the 
interviewees, the perceived necessity for establishing a strong baseline, so that those 
who are at risk do not descend into crises but rather have the capacities to absorb, adapt, 
and transform in the face of adversity.  
“...if you think of emergency people as being the people who deal with 
people who’ve fallen off the edge, then ... the development people really 
need to be talking to them, to find out who falls over the edge, when, why, 
and where the edge is” (Expert interview 8).  
The idea is that a hazard – whether climate-related, or a state’s fragility – only leads to 
crisis if the population are vulnerable. For example, rising water levels only become a 
flood in the absence of adequate embankments, and a flood only becomes a crisis if the 
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communities affected by it are not adequately prepared to deal with flooding. 
Undoubtedly, situations of political violence and armed conflict are different and likely 
to be much more complex. But it might similarly be possible to mitigate some of the 
effects of violence, by establishing a stronger baseline. For example, initiatives that 
promote equality may have some leverage over ethnic tensions. 
Next, a resilience approach was considered to have a strong focus on context-
specificity. Programmes must not only be tailored to what the context requires, but also 
acknowledge as well as build on existing local capacities, as the quote below shows: 
“...the resilience discussion, from our perspective, strongly focuses on the 
aspect of endogenous local capacities that are often not recognised, which 
are suppressed, where also political structures in countries in which the 
situation is deteriorating, are suppressed. A fairly strong focus of the 
resilience message is actually, be very aware of everything that you could 
actually support from the bottom up” (Head of Programme, think tank, 
interview 7 [Translated from Dutch]). 
Related to the above, interviewees asserted that resilience recognises the need for 
responding to crises in a multi-disciplinary manner and the involvement of a wide 
variety of actors – including for example the national and international private sector in 
public-private partnerships. Importantly, the specific context is understood as 
demanding an inter-disciplinary approach. Moreover, rather than to address 
humanitarian needs in isolation, these different actors have to work together in a 
coordinated fashion in order to reduce overall needs. 
Secondly, when discussing the characteristics of a resilience approach, interviewees 
specifically talked about cooperation between humanitarian and development actors. 
Whereas some interviewees used the word ‘integration’, others were particularly wary 
of using this term:  
“...it’s about driving them to work in the same space, at the same time, on 
the basis of their respective comparative advantage ... it’s not about ... the 
closer integration or the merging ... of development and humanitarian 
action, because it’s not. And it shouldn’t be” (Policy Advisor, inter-
governmental organisation, interview 11).  
“What we like to say is, by no means should we be having a joint action, but 
we should be having a joint-up action. And by that we mean that ... we are 
fully abreast of what each other is doing, and we make sure that we’re all 
rowing in the same direction, we all each have our own different roles on 
this journey” (Officer, inter-governmental organisation, interview 12).  
As such, whereas the institutional, ideological and functional divide between 
humanitarian relief and development assistance was identified as a major weakness, 
integrating them is not seen as the answer to this problem per se. Interviewees claimed 
that the complex nature of protracted crises has pushed humanitarian actors in particular 
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to take on roles that are not only outside their mandate, but also for which they lack the 
capacity and skillsets: namely, addressing the underlying reasons for vulnerability. 
Rather than integration of relief and development work, a resilience approach seems to 
be about the effective coordination of relief and development so that all actors present 
can work towards a common goal: 
“I don’t think it is about integration ... I think it is about ensuring that the 
humanitarians can do what the system was designed to do, which is 
principled humanitarian action that meets immediate ... humanitarian needs 
... and the development community can work on the longer term crisis 
drivers and the longer term ... development and well-being ... issues 
associated with vulnerable communities. So if anything, rather than 
integration, it probably is about reframing these ... sets of work maybe a bit 
more strongly than they have been over the past ten years. Because what 
we’ve seen over the last ten years is a bleeding of these boundaries, because 
the humanitarian community has had to pick up so much of this work. So it’s 
not about integration, it’s actually almost about, about re-instating ... the 
comparative advantage if you like, of these two ... sectors” (Policy Advisor, 
inter-governmental organisation, interview 11). 
According to interviewees, humanitarian-development cooperation or coordination 
carries with it an acknowledgement that populations affected by protracted crises need 
both relief aid and development assistance. Whereas humanitarian and development 
workers both have a different and unique skillset, a resilience approach requires a 
(stronger) delineation for relief aid and development assistance organisations’ roles, 
which would allow them to work according to their comparative advantages, making the 
overall response more effective and efficient. Having said that, humanitarian-
development cooperation notably includes conducting joint-up risk analyses and having 
a common strategy – that is, in particular, designing short-term goals by reference to 
long-term goals, as the following interviewee explains: 
“...there has to be a shared or joint analysis to begin with. You know, we 
have to be... agreeing on what it is that the... that the current situation is 
like, right now, we have to agree that this is the scenario, and, we also have 
to agree ... that we have to work together towards common targets. Which is 
why having collective outcomes or collective goals is really important. Now, 
what we do … between that, has to be a play towards strength. So, you 
know, we’re not gonna ask humanitarian agencies to start building bridges 
or to start doing governance exercises, that will still remain the remit of the 
development, but we have to make sure that if we as the humanitarians have 
to say you know what, the health sector needs the biggest amount of help 
here because it can make the, the most dramatic eh, improvement in health 
that will reduce humanitarian needs, then, the development sector could 
take that into account and make sure that they do ... the capacity building ... 
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on the ministry of health side” (Officer, inter-governmental organisation, 
interview 12).  
“[resilience is] to drive development actors into this [same] space so that the 
humanitarians can really sort of better frame their work around immediate 
humanitarian needs, and their development counterparts can take on the 
burden if you like, of working on the crisis drivers that exist in those 
contexts, and the longer term human needs” (Policy Advisor, inter-
governmental organisation, interview 11). 
The excerpts above clearly illustrate how humanitarian-development cooperation is not 
about integration, but rather about a clearer delineation of complementary roles. Indeed, 
this also demonstrates an appreciation of what both sets of actors can contribute in 
situations of crisis, as illustrated by the following quote wherein humanitarians 
acknowledge the important role of their development counterparts:  
“...there’s a huge focus on humanitarians but … one of the most critical 
things that … can actually translate into actual changes for people in terms 
of building their resilience, is all ... by development partners ... it’s 
happening in places, it’s even happening in certain areas of South Sudan. 
But ... that definitely requires them to be less risk averse ... and to actually 
make that a priority, to help people in areas of crisis ... with the sort of 
medium to longer-term assistance that is required to help ... wean them off 
of humanitarian assistance” (Advisor, inter-governmental organisation, 
interview 13). 
In sum, although a ‘resilience-based approach’ can be characterised by an inter-
disciplinary set of actors whose contiguous context-specific programmes are focused on 
the most vulnerable members of a conflict-affected society, resilience is also strongly 
characterised by a recognition of the complementarity of in particular humanitarian and 
development actors.  
 
5.4  Gains and challenges 
The fourth and final major theme concerns what interviewees felt the international 
community has gained from resilience thus far, and what the remaining challenges 
around the use of this concept in policies of protracted crises governance are.  
With regards to resilience’s ‘achievements’ thus far, interviewees spoke primarily about 
how resilience and its underlying set of ideas has produced some tangible changes in the 
thought and practices around protracted crises, most notably how it has fulfilled the role 
of convening mechanism in bringing different actors together. Interviewees asserted that 
as a concept, resilience provides us with a common ground for engagement – a so-called 
‘common language’ or ‘lingua franca’ that allows actors from different contexts to 
engage with one another despite their divergent frames of reference: 
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“...resilience has been useful as a convening term ... and as a shorthand, for 
some of the changes that are needed to the way in which people work, to 
make the programming smarter if you like” (Policy Advisor, inter-
governmental organisation, interview 11). 
The common language argument could nevertheless be used for a multitude of other 
buzzwords, yet interviewees maintained that as opposed to other buzzwords, resilience 
has really made tangible changes in the way that organizations work, as the following 
quotes illustrate:  
“Resilience helped open the shutters, and to say yes, besides our own 
activities there are a lot of other important issues to address if you want to 
work holistically. To do so, we have to work together with other 
organizations. Especially with regards to partnering up with other 
organizations, resilience really helped. And for an organisation like ours, 
which is used to working primarily within its own structures—that is a 
substantial change” (Programme Manager, governmental organisation 
interview 6 [Translated from Dutch]).   
“...something about what it means and represents … has brought about 
much more tangible practical changes at the field level than ever before ... 
from where I sit, I see a lot of efforts being done, like new things or people 
trying things ... much more than before. And before ... like the whole 
discussion around LRRD [Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development] 
and everything, it was often [that] it stayed at that policy theoretical level, it 
stayed at that global level and it never necessarily ended up meaning 
anything for … field staff ... what I’ve been seeing – at least from the 
humanitarian side … just the amount of stuff that they are trying to do ... to 
make this work! And they’re not all doing it in the same way, you know, 
they’re all trying from different perspectives” (Advisor, inter-governmental 
organisation, interview 13). 
As such, resilience seems to have ‘opened up’ organisations, by providing the means to 
engage with a wide variety of actors. Notwithstanding this important gain, resilience 
also introduces significant challenges. First of these being that every organisation has its 
own definition and understanding of resilience: there is no single, agreed-upon 
definition. Some interviewees attribute this to the concept still being ill-defined and 
poorly understood, whereas others understand it as a natural consequence of a concept 
that has to refer to a subject and a context, before its meaning can be properly 
interpreted:  
“I think it’s natural ... resilience… fundamentally is a very context specific 
characteristic of systems. And so, those systems should determine what that 
characteristic looks like” (Head of Research Team, research centre, 
interview 5).  
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“I think it’s become sort of, this... sexy word with donors, so it’s always 
plugged in, but nobody knows exactly what it is. Or how their project 
exactly fits into resilience... but I’m not sure that there is an acceptable 
definition. At [ORGANISATION] we sort of created our own 
understanding, that’s how we understand it, for our purposes, and that’s 
how we want to work towards it... to advocate for it... but I think, other 
organisations will have different views on... depending on their goal, their 
end goal” (Senior Programme Officer, international non-governmental 
organisation, interview 2). 
Indeed, interviewees acknowledged that whereas in abstraction resilience may have 
little meaning, the concept derives its meaning from asking ‘resilience to what?’, 
‘resilience of whom?’, and ‘resilience by what means?  
“Resilience of what? To what? When, and where? Are we talking about 
resilience [at] the macro-level? Are we talking about resilience of state 
structures or the economy as a whole? Or, the resilience of the village, or 
resilience of the community, or resilience of your household … And 
resilience to what exactly? Because … our resilience to climate change 
takes a totally different kind of operation than the resilience to a banking 
crisis for example … and the word resilience applies perfectly to both” 
(Independent Consultant, inter-governmental organisation, interview 4). 
“... it doesn’t tell you anything about what to do. It gives you some questions 
to ask. That’s... what it does. Resilience gives you some questions to ask” 
(Research Fellow, think tank, interview 8). 
The ideas illustrated by these quotes seem to imply that ‘resilience’ is an adjective 
wrongly understood to be a noun, which suggests that it refers to a characteristic 
feature of a system’s or individual’s response to crisis rather than the act of 
responding as such. Understandably, resilience thus remains difficult to define. It 
should thus come as no surprise that measurement was a common challenge 
mentioned by almost all interviewees, as illustrated by the following excerpts:  
“We know for which topics we want to lobby ... we know who the 
stakeholders are, we know the change we want, but how do you measure 
that? And how do you know at certain points that you are still on track, 
whether it is still useful what you are doing? We still have to learn how to 
get better at that. So it is an ongoing debate, I cannot give you an answer as 
to how far along we are with regards to measurement, but I can tell you 
how difficult it is” (Programme Manager, governmental organisation, 
interview 6 [Translated from Dutch]).  
“...we still are struggling with the measurement of resilience. I don’t want to 
enter too much in the technical part, but it has been a long and huge debate 
among research hub, academic, UN agencies and donors, to... think of a 
single mechanism a single methodology, to … agree on how to measure 
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resilience. And we are in 2016, we still don’t have it” (Thematic 
Coordinator, inter-governmental organisation, interview 9).   
Besides conceptual and measurement challenges, resilience, understood as an approach 
that employs a particular, coordinated form of relief aid and development assistance 
cooperation, also brings with it certain more practical challenges. A notable challenge 
mentioned by interviewees concerned humanitarians’ fear of aid politicization. Since 
development partners work with host governments, humanitarians fear the 
endangerment of their principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence if they 
steer towards a closer collaboration with their development counterparts. This however, 
assumes both parties welcome a closer collaboration. Whereas most interviewees were 
positive about the idea of humanitarian-development cooperation, some explicitly 
cautioned against possible differences of opinion. As the excerpt below illustrates, there 
may be humanitarian organisations that feel that resilience concerns the longer-term, 
structural work, and would thus does not fall within their mandate: 
“...to me, building resilience is … long-term, you can’t do it [in] 6 months … 
so therefore it’s not emergency, it’s [not] in the domain of emergency people 
to do, to worry about. It’s in the domain of development, because it’s long-
term and it’s structural and you’ve got to address that. And that is what we 
call … development. I mean it’s probably not a great word, but you know, if 
you talk about a development emergency divide, [resilience is] on the 
development side” (Research Fellow, think tank, interview 8). 
The above implies that if a resilience approach is to be successful in reducing 
vulnerability, not only do development actors need to be convinced that protracted 
crises fall within their mandate, humanitarians must also be convinced that resilience 
work is part of their duty. These challenges nevertheless illustrate that not everyone 
within the humanitarian or development community sees working more closely together 






  DISCUSSION 
 
 
Taken together, the academic debates on resilience and practitioners’ understanding of 
the concept converge around a number of themes, although approaches to the identified 
themes differ, sometimes substantially.  
First, the results of this study indicate that resilience is clearly a response to external 
conditions, first and foremost a radically different understanding of contemporary risks 
and crises. In the literature, crises are perceived to have been reconceptualised as 
inevitable and unknowable, ascribing responsibility for its effects to the vulnerabilities 
of society. Rather than inevitable and unknowable, practitioners emphasise that crises 
are recurrent and protracted, i.e. stretched in time and inherently complex. Their 
perception seems to be that crises are increasingly more difficult to address. In contrast 
to the past, contemporary crises simply ‘do not end anymore’, with the result that short-
term emergency actors’ presence is required on a long-term basis. Practitioners 
helplessly watch humanitarian needs grow bigger each year, painfully aware that they 
do not have the funds, manpower or structures to address them. Importantly, 
practitioners also see resilience as an answer to their own internal challenges, not just 
the sheer overload of cases. They are confronted with the fact that the system within 
which they work cannot effectively respond to today’s crises, and that the activities that 
are now seen as necessary due to a renewed understanding of crises, do not fit within 
existing structures. This has prompted a radical self-reflection that has culminated in a 
perceived need for self-transformation. This concerns in particular the need for joint-up 
efforts between the humanitarian and development arm of the international community, 
which have traditionally been separated on the basis of their ideological, functional, and 
institutional differences.  
Second, there is a clear difference in understanding between scholars and practitioners 
with regards to what resilience ‘does’ in practice. The academic literature focuses on 
resilience as decentralization, which has worried some that resilience adds up to a 
neoliberal abdication of responsibilities and a rationale for cutting budgets in times of 
austerity. Here, debates around resilience closely resemble those around the paradigm 
shift within security towards risk-based thinking, characterised by risk, anticipation, and 
prevention (Johnston & Shearing, 2003). Counterarguments point in particular to the 
wider range of meanings that resilience has, aside from the state transferring the 
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responsibility for security to citizens. Authors also question how much responsibility 
the state is willing to give away, considering desired behaviours (i.e. resilient 
behaviour) are often prescribed in emergency protocols – signalling a contradiction 
inherent to the regulation of emergent behaviours.  
Practitioners understand resilience in a much more pragmatic sense, and have tried to 
answer what ‘doing resilience’ actually means in practice. According to these accounts, 
resilience has a significant focus on affected people’s capacities, greater local ownership 
and the need to build on existing structures – much like the existing literature and work 
around capacity development. The 2015 Dead Sea Resilience Agenda for example, 
emphasises in one of its five core principles that resilience has to reinforce rather than 
replace local capacities. Likewise, the EU Approach to Resilience (2012) emphasises 
that “Resilience can only be built bottom-up. The starting point for the EU approach to 
resilience therefore is a firm recognition of the leading role of partner countries” (p. 11), 
and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) emphasises that it differs from 
previous regional response plans because it focuses on “strengthening national 
ownership and ensuring alignment to national and local development planning 
frameworks” (p. 4). As such, whereas critical scholarship seems to focus on the negative 
implications of ‘responsibilisation’, practitioners emphasise the empowerment inherent 
to increased local ownership and inclusion. 
At face value, that seems much like decentralisation and assigning more responsibility 
to the locale. Yet if we are allowed the freedom to, for a moment, liken the international 
community to a state, resilience is much less about rolling back government, but rather, 
about capitalising on what already exists locally, while responsibility remains with the 
‘state’, i.e. international actors. This has also been referred to as a state that steers (i.e. 
providing guidance, direction), while delegating the task of ‘rowing’ to others (Osborne 
& Gaebler, 1992). Indeed, it is often said that humanitarian and development actors 
should ‘do more’ rather than less. Resilience, more than anything, means combining the 
strengths of humanitarian and development actors, which can hardly refer to a 
dissemination of governance. This might be due in part because the subject on the other 
end of humanitarian relief or development assistance, is still regarded primarily as 
vulnerable – illustrated by the apparent belief that resilience also means a stronger focus 
on ‘the most vulnerable’ so that no-one is left behind as per World Humanitarian 
Summit creed. It therefore seems unlikely that the focus on resilience will mean that 
affected people will be more meaningfully involved in emergency response, considering 
a vulnerability framing tends to take agency away rather than grant it. As such, this 
indicates a gap between the political rhetoric of resilience and how it does and does not 
play out in practice. It is nevertheless important to note that resilience and the 
responsibility for self-protection has been explicitly resisted by some disaster-affected 
communities. A New Orleans pamphlet circulated at the 10-year anniversary of 
Hurricane Katrina read: “Stop calling me resilient. Because every time you say, ‘Oh, 
they’re resilient’ that means you can do something else to me. I am not resilient.” 
(Brown, 2016, p.191).  
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The New Orleans notice critiques the shift of the burden of recovery onto individuals 
and communities themselves, implying that “if communities are resilient, then they can 
absorb shocks and do not need protection” (Brown, 2016, p. 191). Whereas dysfunction 
may be more uncommon than previously assumed, resilience may also be indicative of 
a ‘romanticisation’ of local capacities (Mac Ginty, 2014). In relation to man-made 
disasters, resilience, after all, reveals its limits: who is resilient against nuclear warfare, 
or even the sudden escalation of ethnic violence as during the genocide in Rwanda, in 
which a significant part of the population was murdered with machetes over just a three-
day period? 
Third, scholars have problematized the reconstruction of exposure to adversity as 
‘opportunity’ and resilient functioning as a ‘learnable skill’, in which resilience risks 
becoming a neo-Darwinist measure of the fitness to survive. Particularly unsettling is 
that when adaptation becomes a virtue, the moral basis for social security disappears. 
Moreover, an exposure-as-opportunity governance model would probably make the 
existence of social security become financially impossible. Along the same lines, 
scholars have indicated that if resilience is learnable, it can also be failed to learn, de 
facto responsibilising people for not only their resilience but also their vulnerabilities – 
rendering invisible the structural factors that limit individuals’ agency and (at least 
partly) define their vulnerabilities. Indeed, a number of authors explicitly ask why these 
issues (e.g. poverty, inequality) are absent from debates around resilience (see for 
example Bulley, 2013). The question is whether and why resilience intentionally wards 
off challenges to the systems and institutions in which individuals are located, and 
scholarly interrogation of these controversies is urgent. 
Practitioners seem to be divided as with regards to the possible de-politicisation of a 
resilience approach. Whereas some have pointed to a disconnect between academic 
debates and the ‘reality on the ground’, few others recognise this danger inherent to the 
concept. One interviewee in particular stressed that resilience continues an already-
existing trend in which states are absolved from their responsibilities, facilitated by 
NGOs that take their place in providing essential services. In the end, this results in 
unsustainable solutions, because citizens should be able to demand services from their 
governments rather than external parties. Practitioners do worry however, that from a 
moral perspective, the call to see crises as opportunities cannot be communicated to 
people who have lost everything,  
Fourth, both scholars and practitioners see resilience as a ‘lingua franca’ that provides a 
common platform for engagement between different kind of actors, cutting across 
sectoral and disciplinary boundaries. Here, the expert interviews have undoubtedly 
substantiated the scholarly debate, providing various examples of what this ‘lingua 
franca’ does in practice. In short, it seems that resilience has enabled organisations to 
open up to partnerships with different actors, as if resilience has helped them realise 
working together is crucial to success. Practically however, this will be anything but 
easy, and not just because of the significantly different institutional structures. 
Collaboration between humanitarian and development partners in particular is seen as 
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highly problematic, and moreover, not accepted by all. Médecins sans Frontières for 
example, walked out of the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in May 2016 with the 
explicit message that they were not a development organisation. About their walk-out, 
they publicly stated their disapproval of “the WHS’s focus [that] would seem to be an 
incorporation of humanitarian assistance into a broader development and resilience 
agenda” (MSF, 2016, para. 3). This indicates a further need to (re)align the goals and 
expectations that exist at either side of this ‘humanitarian-development nexus’. The 
EU’s SHARE and AGIR initiatives are generally regarded as testing grounds for 
humanitarian–development cooperation (Joseph, 2014), but it remains to be seen what 
lessons learned emerge from these.  
Finally, both scholars and practitioners attest to resilience’s omnipresence in 
(international) responses to humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises and (in)security 
more broadly. It may be clear by now that resilience’s context and issue-specificity – 
illustrated by the fact that it prompts questions of resilience to what, of whom, and so on 
– relieves much of the conceptual ambiguity, but it does not answer many of the 
questions that resilience leaves us with, for example whether resilience should be 
accepted as a governance rationality. Cornwall and Brock (2005) argue that it is exactly 
buzzwords’ “propensity to shelter multiple meanings [that] makes them politically 
expedient, shielding those who use them from attack by lending the possibility of 
common meaning to extremely disparate actors” (p. 1056). In other words, resilience’s 
ambiguity and ‘lingua franca’ properties may be one of the reasons it became, and is 
still, so popular. The practitioner accounts most effectively show how resilience rose to 
prominence through multiple parallel dynamic processes, including a ‘bandwagon 
effect’ where the use of the term by governments and donors pushes adoption by lower-
level agencies and organisations. Périn and Attaran (2003) describe a similar top-down 
process in which donor ideology is the primarily determinant of how international aid is 
spent. Of course there is a strong pragmatic argument for adopting donor ideologies, 
where – put simply, organisation’s financial support and organisational survival 
depends on it. This culminates, however, in the uncritical adoption of resilience, 
illustrated by the fact that discussions revolve around how to implement resilience, 
rather than should we implement resilience. This tendency is also reflected in this study, 
where scholarly engagement with resilience is a critical investigation into the meaning 
of the concept, whereas practitioners are more concerned with the technical application 
of the donors’ next buzzword.  
This may be illustrative of a common ideological reinforcement mechanism, where 
discussions are focused “on the means employed to achieve the supposedly altruistic 
ends claimed by those in power, instead of asking whether the proclaimed aims are the 
real ones, or whether those pursuing them have the right to do so [emphasis in original]” 
(Bricmont, 2006, p. 32). Humanitarian and development organisations may not feel 
powerful opposite governments and international donor agencies, but need nevertheless 
remain aware that in the eyes of conflict-affected individuals, communities, and 




  CONCLUSION 
 
 
The objective of this study was to critically explore the concept of resilience as it relates 
to governance rationalities underlying (international) responses to humanitarian 
emergencies, protracted crises and (in)security more broadly. This work was important 
because despite resilience’s omnipresence in the international policy arena, the concept 
remains contested. In order to advance current understandings of resilience as it relates 
to the world’s fragile contexts characterised by political violence and armed conflict, 
this study reviewed the existing academic debates on resilience from various 
disciplines, such as political science, international relations, security studies, 
development studies etc., and combined this with an exploration of the opinions and 
perceptions of resilience experts in the field, with diverse professional experiences 
across a range of international development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding 
organisations at the governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental level.  
The results of this study allow for a better understanding of where the debate on 
resilience stands, and what ‘resilience’ actually means in the context of (inter)national 
responses to insecurity due to political violence and armed conflict. In our 
understanding, resilience is an unfinished concept that refers primarily to a certain 
interpretation of the world, logically followed by a particular normative construction of 
subjects and their responses to emerging insecurity. A more interesting question is 
however, whether resilience should be adopted as a principle for organising 
international efforts. Essentially, the answer to this question rests squarely on whether 
‘resilience’ could become a driver for effective, appropriate and acceptable programmes 
for peoples affected by insecurity.  
First and foremost, local people – whether European publics faced with the threat of 
terrorism, or persons forced to live in refugee and displaced persons camps in Africa or 
the Middle East – have to be meaningfully included, not just in the implementation of 
programmes that target them, but also in the design of international responses. Inclusion 
is not only a moral obligation, it is also crucial to any endeavour’s effectiveness, 
appropriateness and acceptability – and hence, its success. Resilience, with its inherent 
emphasis on the affected person’s or community’s capabilities, has the potential to steer 
towards inclusive, bottom-up and context-informed responses, albeit the results of this 
study imply that this potential is currently not or under-utilised. The current conception 
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of conflict-affected populations is still a disempowering one of victims and 
vulnerability. On a more positive note, ‘victimisation’ as a term also points towards ‘a 
right to assistance’, and as such, it should be complemented with the strengths that 
communities possess, not only in terms of existing structures, but also of being 
‘survivors’ and ‘first responders’. Discouragingly, resilience’s current conceptualisation 
of populations affected by insecurity is one of ‘the most vulnerable’; communities of 
victims that possess structures that could be built upon – seemingly without an explicit 
awareness that this could potentially result in the indiscriminate reinforcement of local 
power relations. A similarly disempowering notion of inclusion could possibly 
culminate in the tokenistic employment of local people in humanitarian or development 
operations, defined by their exclusion when it comes to employment benefits and 
evacuation in case of immediate danger. Instead, resilience and inclusion should refer to 
peoples that are both victims and survivors, both vulnerable and resilient. It should refer 
to peoples not only with a right to assistance, but also with a right to shape the form of 
that assistance, much like a client determines the services it procures, rather than that 
these are shaped by the service provider.   
Second, there have been noteworthy efforts towards theorising resilience. Many of these 
theories, although incomplete, imply that resilience is complicit in the erasure of the 
system structures within which social life is embedded, including the shocks that tear 
life apart. This is worrying – in particular because of the rapid and widespread uptake of 
resilience and similar ideologies into (international) policies. If resilience indeed 
compels us to understand crises as inevitable, thus discouraging any interrogation into 
the structures upon which this reality is built (e.g., global inequality), we are undeniably 
facing some sort of ‘political death’ – exactly because resilience advocates for 
adaptation within the structure rather than structural change. Moreover, (international) 
efforts based on this principle can never result in effective, appropriate and acceptable 
responses to international insecurity, because they fail to address their flawed, if not 
broken, foundations. Indeed, if we truly want to build resilience in the most basic sense 
of the word, i.e., to build societies’ ability to absorb shocks, adapt to changing realities, 
and transform in order to function better, it is absolutely crucial to interrogate the 
underlying structures that directly or indirectly generate crises.  
Finally, ‘resilience’ clearly indicates that there is a stark contrast between past and 
present understandings of social reality. Across fields and disciplines, there is an almost 
constant reference to how the contemporary world is more complex, more 
interdependent, more unpredictable and protracted than ever before. This indicates a 
shift away from the principle of simplification (i.e., Occam’s razor) that underlies much 
of science in general, and implies instead a ‘turn to complexity’. Theorisations of 
resilience however seem to have taken this to the extreme, constructing a world that is 
complex to the point where interventions become absurd. Perhaps it is not so much the 
concept of resilience that is the problem, but rather our contemporary understanding of 
crises as inevitable and (too) complex, to which resilience is essentially a reaction – 
rather than that this perception of risks and crises is inherent in the concept. Resilience, 
then, boils down to the question: ‘Do we shape life, or does life shape us?’ 
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There is some relief in the idea that risk and crises are attributes of society – internal, 
rather than external to us. Whereas this is one of the primary critiques of resilience (i.e., 
that individuals/communities are problematized and responsibilised), the argument this 
study advances is that the internalisation of risks simply has not happened on a deep 
enough level: it stays at the surface and thus becomes problematic. It could be said that 
a community in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is not at risk of violence 
because they are situated in an area of conflict mines, or because they lack sustainable 
livelihoods, or because their community lacks social cohesion – rather, they are at risk 
fundamentally because of global social structures that reproduce the existence of 
conflict mines (e.g., the opacity of the global resource trade), poverty (e.g., global 
inequality), and divisions across sectarian or ethnic lines (e.g., colonial legacies). As 
such, we should not seek the cause of risks and crises in individuals’ or individual 
communities’ risk factors, but rather in the deeper structure of the social world as a risk 
factor in and of itself. If we try to shape life, we may fail, but if we let life shape us, we 
might end up reinforcing the detrimental effects of the structures we have ourselves 
created, such as deepening inequalities, growing poverty, and so on. 
This is also where we would suggest are avenues for further research; how do we put 
‘power’ back into resilience and counter its de-politicising effects? How can we use 
resilience as a governance rationality for humanitarian emergencies, protracted crises 
and (in)security, while still addressing questions of power, justice, and equality? Or 
rather, how can we make addressing power, (in)justice, and (in)equality a prerequisite 
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Annex A: Interview Guide 
 
1. Can you first tell me a little bit about your work and to what extent you work 
with the concept of resilience? 
2. In your opinion, what are the most important – and potentially beneficial – 
aspects of a resilience-based approach?  
3. On the other hand, what are sensible critiques on the idea of resilience and 
where can we still improve?  
4. How did resilience get onto the global agenda? 
a. What particular events pushed policymakers to adopt a resilience-based 
approach? 
b. What individuals/organisations pushed for the adoption of a resilience-
based approach?   
c. What role did grassroots organisations play in putting resilience on the 
global agenda? 
5. (Internal frame) In how far does the policy community agree on definitions or 
operationalisations of resilience?  
a. If there are any disagreements, how can they be characterised? 
6. (External frame) What is it about particular framings of resilience that gets the 
attention from political leaders and donors? 
7. How can we ‘measure’ resilience?  
8. What are the so-called ‘active ingredients’ of resilience-building interventions? 
a. In how far are they evidence-based?  
9. Some critical scholars have argued that resilience, in its shift from deficit to 
asset model, obscures the underlying reasons for vulnerability, and as a result 
depoliticizes people’s hardships. How would you answer to that?  
10. How does resilience relate to a human rights-based approach?   
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Annex C: Consent Form 
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   Yes  please tick  I agree to be interviewed 
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